Creditors\u27 Rights in Taiwan: A Comparison of Corporate Reorganization Law in the United States and the Republic of China by Winn, Jane Kaufman
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 13 | Number 3 Article 2
Summer 1988
Creditors' Rights in Taiwan: A Comparison of
Corporate Reorganization Law in the United States
and the Republic of China
Jane Kaufman Winn
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jane K. Winn, Creditors' Rights in Taiwan: A Comparison of Corporate Reorganization Law in the United States and the Republic of China,
13 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 409 (1988).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol13/iss3/2
Creditors' Rights in Taiwan: A Comparison of
Corporate Reorganization Law in the United
States and the Republic of China
Jane Kaufman Winn*
I. Introduction .......................................... 410
II. Economic Regulation and Company Law ............... 412
A. Economic Regulation in the Republic of China ..... 412
1. Law and Authority in Chinese Culture ......... 412
2. The Legal System of the ROC on Taiwan ...... 415
3. Economic Development and Business Practices . 417
B. A Comparison of U.S. and ROC Company Law .... 422
1. U.S. Company Law ............................ 423
2. ROC Company Law ........................... 424
III. Policies Underlying Corporate Reorganization .......... 427
A. Historical Background of U.S. Bankruptcy and Reor-
ganization Law .............................. 428
B. Policies of ROC Bankruptcy and Reorganization
L aw .............................................. 432
1. Fraudulent and Nonfraudulent Insolvency ...... 433
2. Access to Reorganization Proceedings .......... 434
3. Equal Treatment for Creditors ................. 436
4. Maximize the Debtor's Estate .................. 437
5. Harmonize Bankruptcy With Other Creditors'
Rem edies ..................................... 438
IV. ROC Reorganization Proceedings in Detail ............. 440
A. Commencement of the Case ................... 440
1. Access to Court-Ordered Reorganization ....... 440
2. Inadequate Notice of Opportunity to Contest for
Interested Parties .............................. 444
3. Dissipation of Company Assets While the Peti-
tion Is Being Considered ...................... 445
* Associate, Shearman & Sterling, New York, New York; J.D. 1987, Harvard Law
School. Most of the research for this paper was done in 1985-86 while the author was in
Taiwan on a fellowship from the Harvard Club of the ROC. The author wishes to thank
the Harvard Club of the ROC, Professor Thomas H. Jackson, Steven R. Champion, C.C.
Chen, Hank W. Peng, James D. Vaughn, and Thomas H. McGowan, Esq.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
4. Substantive Consolidation of Cases Involving
Companies with Affiliates ...................... 446
B. Management of the Estate ......................... 447
1. Conduct of the Reorganization Manager ....... 447
2. Reorganization Supervisors Are Ineffective in
Protecting Creditors' Interests ................. 448
3. No Critical Review of Some Creditors' Claims .. 450
4. Inadequate Mechanisms for Voiding Fraudulent
or Preferential Transfers ....................... 451
C. Conduct of Creditors' Meetings ................... 455
1. Existing Class Divisions Are Too Broad ........ 455
2. Conflicting Perspectives Make Agreement on a
Plan Diffi cult .................................. 456
D. Quality of Plans Submitted ........................ 458
1. ROC Company Law Has No Workable "Feasibil-
ity" Standard .................................. 458
2. Creditors' Claims Cannot Be Converted to Eq-
uity in the Reorganized Company .............. 460
V . Case Studies .......................................... 461
A. Delta Petrochemical/Grand Pacific ................. 461
B. Pao Lung Pulp and Paper Company ............... 463
C . T a N un ........................................... 467
V I. C onclusion ............................................ 469
I. Introduction
This article is based on a study of the company reorganization
law of the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) undertaken in 1986
for the Banking Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce
in Taipei. The study was designed to compare the ROC reorganiza-
tion statute with the U.S. company reorganization statute in order to
produce proposals for reform of the ROC statute. An examination
of the experiences of creditors who participated in court-ordered re-
organizations in the ROC from 1983 to 1986 reveals several major
sources of creditor dissatisfaction. 2
I Many facts and statutory interpretations given in this article were provided to the
author in interviews. Some interviewees agreed to speak freely concerning their exper-
iences and opinions in exchange for assurances that there would not be attributions of
comments likely to disturb long-standing business relationships. Not all assertions, there-
fore, can be substantiated in conventional footnote form.
2 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of foreign banks set up branches
in Taipei. Two major factors contributed to this unprecedented flood of foreign banks
into the local ROC banking market. The official ROC policy at that time was to encourage
foreign banks to establish operations in Taiwan. Also, many banks from major financial
centers around the world were flush with petrodollars from the second major round of oil
price increases and were looking for new markets in which to place those funds.
In the early 1980s, the economy of Taiwan moved into its first serious and prolonged
recession in over a decade, causing many companies to become insolvent. Those compa-
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One essential prerequisite to any successful form of court super-
vised debtor relief is the ability of the courts actually to assert juris-
diction over the debtor and prevent fraud. Experience in both the
United States and the ROC shows that any legal procedure aimed at
debtor relief that is not combined with adequate court control of the
proceedings acts as an open invitation to debtor misconduct. The
prospects for a workable court-ordered reorganization process in
Taiwan, therefore, depend in part on the ability and willingness of
the ROC courts to take control of the proceedings.
The reorganization process in Taiwan is initiated after a peti-
tioner files with the court and the petition is reviewed by government
agencies such as the Industrial Development Board of the Ministry of
Economic Affairs and the Taiwan Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (Taiwan SEC).
Once a reorganization has officially commenced, ROC law pro-
vides inadequate constraints on the conduct of the "reorganization
manager" (similar to the "debtor in possession" under U.S. law).
The provisions under ROC law for a "reorganization supervisor" to
oversee the activities of the reorganization manager and to represent
the creditors' interests have proven ineffective. Some tougher mech-
anism is needed to prevent or discipline self-interested conduct by
company management and to maximize the value of the estate for
the benefit of creditors.
Local and foreign bankers have been unable to set common
objectives within creditors' committee meetings in part because of
the different management philosophies of the two groups of bankers.
Local banks in the ROC are often government-owned. Local bank
employees, therefore, are subject to civil service regulations that se-
verely limit the exercise of any independent business judgment. Bu-
reaucratic constraints on local bankers have made it more difficult to
reach a consensus with foreign bankers who place greater emphasis
on financial analysis in making decisions.
Plans submitted by reorganization managers have often been so
unrealistic in projections of future earnings and other variables as to
call into question whether the managers prepared the plans in good
faith. Current ROC laws and court inaction have allowed manage-
ment to use delay in submitting plans to improve their bargaining
power in negotiations with creditors. Needless formality and rigidity
in ROC company law has stifled attempts at innovative solutions
within reorganization plans.
This article examines some possible reforms of the ROC com-
hies invoked the reorganization provisions of the ROC Company Law for the first time.
Foreign banks were forced not only to contend with ROC reorganization procedures, but
also with substantial losses to local businesses. Interview with Tracy Cheng, Senior Vice
President, Taiwan Stock Exchange, in Taipei (Apr. 1986).
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pany reorganization statute in detail. The source of most proposals
is the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Significant differences between the
legal and economic environments of the United States and the ROC,
however, make the wholesale transplant of current U.S. law inade-
quate to deal with many issues raised in the ROC context.
II. Economic Regulation and Company Law
Important differences exist between the legal systems of the
United States and the ROC. The U.S. legal system is part of the
Anglo-American legal tradition, while the ROC system is part of the
civil law tradition. More important than any structural difference be-
tween the U.S. and ROC legal systems, however, is the relative im-
portance of the legal system within the larger context of the national
economic, political, and social systems. The formal legal system of
the ROC today does not enjoy the same prominent position within
Taiwanese society that the legal system enjoys in the United States.
Laws and regulations often are of marginal relevance to most devel-
opments in Taiwan because actual conduct and events refer to social
norms and political power rather than to the formal legal system.
The interpretation of any statute, including the Company Law
reorganization provisions, is subject to qualification because of the
diminished authority of the ROC legal system in general. This sec-
tion of this article looks at the legal system of the ROC and the de-
velopment of company law to determine to what extent ideas
borrowed from the U.S. system of regulating economic and financial
markets have any chance of success in dealing with challenges faced
by ROC policymakers.
A. Economic Regulation in the Republic of China
The legal system plays a central role in economic regulation and
business decision making in the United States. Court-ordered reor-
ganizations are only one small element of that very legalistic business
and economic environment. Businessmen and government officials
in the ROC today rely much less on their legal system in meeting
individual and national economic objectives. This difference results
from traditional Chinese ideas about law and from the recent history
of the ROC.
1. Law and Authority in Chinese Culture
The Confucian tradition in China remains important in under-
standing the social and political systems of the ROC. ROC schools
actively promote Confucian classics and the thought of Dr. Sun Yat-
Sen, the father of the Chinese republic. 3 The Confucian tradition
3 Goldstein, Rich Heritage Faces Obstacles, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 8, 1985, at 33.
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emphasizes respect for authority and personal relationships and den-
igrates formal legal rights and obligations. 4 Confucian classics em-
phasize the authority of parents, teachers, and the national leader as
well as the duty of subordinates such as wives, children, or subjects
to obey.5 Confucianism expects those in positions of authority to
rule by virtuous example and to dedicate themselves to the paternal-
istic care of their subordinates. 6 Dr. Sun reinforced that paternalistic
tradition with his theory that the Chinese people required a period of
tutelage before they would be ready to participate in a modern de-
mocracy with constitutional government. 7
Confucian thought also emphasizes the importance of family
and personal relationships. Maintenance of harmonious family and
social relationships is considered the greatest virtue, while resort to
formal laws to maintain the social order is considered decadent and
vulgar.8 Persons in subordinate positions should be guided by their
sense of shame while persons in positions of authority should be
guided by their education and highly developed sense of personal
virtue. 9 Even the Legalist school of philosophy, which scholars con-
sidered to be in radical opposition to the Confucian school of philos-
ophy, emphasized law as a mechanism of social control that could be
used to increase the power of the state and to weaken feudal opposi-
tion to a centralized monarchy.' 0 Little or nothing in the Chinese
tradition corresponds to the modern Western preoccupation with in-
dividual rights and the idea that law can be used to safeguard the
liberty of citizens against the tyranny of rulers. Even Dr. Sun be-
lieved that in a Chinese form of democracy the Chinese ideas of obli-
gation and duty should be substituted for the Western liberal idea of
individual rights. " I
Although legal codes have existed in China for hundreds of
years, codified law contained, until recently, little more than a sum-
mary of criminal penalties for highly antisocial acts.1 2 Local custom-
4 See Schwartz, On Attitudes Toward Law in China, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW AND THE
INDIVIDUAL (M. Katz ed. 1957).
5 Ma Han-Bao, Law and Morality: Some Reflections on the Chinese Experience Past and Pres-
ent, 21 PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST 443, 444 (1971).
6 L. THOMPSON, CHINESE RELIGION 14 (1979).
The Master said, "If the people be led by laws and uniformity sought to be
given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the punishments, but have
no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue and uniformity sought to be given
them by the rules of propriety, they will have the sense of shame and more-
over will become good."
CONFUCIAN ANALECTS: THE GREAT LEARNING AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN, Book
II, ch. 3 reprinted in THE CHINESE CLASSICS, Vol. 1, at 146 (J. Legge trans. 1893/1983).
7 SUN YAT-SEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION 1-7 (1953).
8 See Ma, supra note 5.
9 CH'( T'UNG-Tsu, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 226 (1961).
10 Id. at 241-43.
II SUN YAT-SEN, THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE 46-52 (1981 ed.).
12 See S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA 56 (1962/1977).
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ary law provided the substance of what might be considered civil
law. 13 The family and personal relations embodied in customary law
formed the primary basis for the social order.' 4 The formal legal
system was reserved primarily for punishing the common people to
supplement and reinforce their sense of shame and their desire to
follow the virtuous example of their leaders.' 5
The idea that legal regulations are vulgar, punitive, and applica-
ble only to the common people still has influence in Taiwan today.
Drawing an analogy between regulations and a sports playing field
illustrates the difference between U.S. and Chinese attitudes on law
and economic regulation.' 6 The U.S. style of regulation allows any-
one interested to come onto the field and play in any game, provided
that all players obey the rules and the instructions of the referees.
The Chinese style of regulation shuts off the entire playing field and
allows only those individuals whose character has been carefully
screened to enter. Once in the field, however, the regulations allow
those individuals to do whatever they want without any interference
from the referees.' 7 The analogy captures some of the traditional
Chinese disrespect for formal law and the emphasis placed on moral
character and hierarchy.
The traditional Chinese contempt for legalism and preference
for informal personal relations is a factor that contributes to the un-
derdeveloped state of the ROC legal system today. 18 When a West-
ern-style legal system was first introduced in Ch'ing China, the
leadership discouraged litigation by a yariety of formal and informal
means. Local leaders discouraged litigation in their communities be-
cause it reflected poorly on their leadership.' 9 Corruption among
the staff of law courts was notorious. 20 The Chinese feared the arbi-
trariness and oppression of the magistrates who, in turn, actively en-
couraged the resolution of disputes through mediation within
communities and limited the jurisdiction of their courts. 21 Common
people feared any entanglement with formal legal processes. 22 They
often ignored obvious violations of the law in order to avoid being
drawn into a criminal investigation and receiving possible
punishment.23
13 Id. at 102-03.
14 Id.
15 CH'U, supra note 9, at 177.
16 Interview with Paul Hsu, managing partner, Lee & Li, Attorneys at Law, in Taipei
(June 1986).
17 Id.
18 See Ma, supra note 5, at 455-57; M. MOSER, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN A CHINESE
COMMUNITY 60-65 (1982).
19 S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 12, at 72.
20 Id. at 77.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See generally M. MOSER, supra note 18; S. VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra note 12; Brock-
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Some Chinese defend the traditional Chinese aversion to litiga-
tion and preference for informal mediation in terms of Confucian
moral theories. 24 Confucianists regard litigation as anti-social and
disreputable behavior because it involves public expressions of hos-
tility which are damaging to the community. A virtuous person
should be willing to compromise self-interest in the interest of the
harmony of the community and so submit to mediation.25
The aversion to litigation is also a result of the lack of an effec-
tive and responsive forum in which to litigate.26 Michael Moser, an
American anthropologist and lawyer, discovered that when a judicial
forum which Chinese perceive as fair and impartial is made available,
they are quite willing to litigate their problems.
27
2. The Legal System of the ROC on Taiwan
The first attempts to create a Western-style legal system for
China were made during the final years of the Ch'ing dynasty. These
efforts were ineffective and the successful republican revolution of
1911 swept them aside. 28 Following the 1911 revolution, political
power in China passed through the hands of various warlords. Dr.
Sun Yat-Sen founded the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) in
1919 to take control of the government from the warlords. Although
Dr. Sun died in 1925, the KMT under the leadership of Chiang Kai-
Shek officially gained control of the government in 1927.
Once in control, the KMT began a wide ranging program of
legal reform. The KMT created the modern Chinese legal system,
drawing heavily on the German Civil Code.29 Political and economic
realities, however, prevented the legal reforms from having a signifi-
cant impact on society. Warlords remained an active political force
even after 1927. The KMT was preoccupied with suppressing the
man, Commercial Contract Law in Late 19th Century Taiwan, in ESSAYS ON CHINA'S LEGAL TRA-
DITION 76 U. Cohen, R. Edwards & Fu-Mei Chang Chen, eds. 1980).
24 Cf. Ma, supra note 5 (discussion of the renewed emphasis on traditional Confucian
morality).
25 See M. MOSER, supra note 18, at 61-67.
26 Id. at 72-73, 174-85.
27 Id.
28 For example, in 1907 a bankruptcy law was drafted and promulgated. Chambers
of Commerce, modern successors to the guilds, were to play a major role in administering
cases. The law contained many new expressions in Chinese in an attempt to combine
traditional practices and imported modern innovations, but the result was just ambiguity.
Due to resistance which emerged within the bureaucracy, the law was repealed before it
was ever used. One provision gave government debt the same priority as private obliga-
tions, reversing the pre-existing rule. Since there was no public support or understanding
of the law, bureaucrats were able to have the whole statute repealed rather than simply
revise the offending provision. Mitrano, The Chinese Bankruptcy Law of 1906-1907: A Legisla-
tive Case History, 25 HARV. L. SCH. STUD. E. ASIAN L. (CHINA) 278 (1973).
29 The German Civil Code'was considered the most modern legal system in the world
at that time. The Japanese had borrowed extensively from the German system in modern-
izing their legal system in the late nineteenth century.
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Communist insurrection until forced to confront the Japanese inva-
sion in 1937. Following World War II China again lapsed into Civil
War until the Communist victory in 1949.
China had ceded the island of Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty
of Shimonoseki in 1895.30 Japan developed Taiwan as an agricul-
tural colony and thus, spared Taiwan much of the upheaval mainland
China suffered during the 1920s and 1930s. After Taiwan was re-
turned to Chinese control in 1945, the situation rapidly deteriorated.
Hyperinflation spread from mainland China and food shortages de-
veloped on Taiwan. The KMT violently suppressed an uprising by
the Taiwanese against KMT rule in March 1947. 31
The government of the ROC moved to Taiwan in 1949. The
Nationalist government in Taiwan adopted a constitution in 1946,
but suspended substantial portions of it in 1948 due to the civil
war.32 In 1948, the legislature adopted emergency measures al-
lowing President Chiang Kai-Shek to rule by executive order "during
the period of the temporary emergency arising from the Communist
insurgency." 33 Martial law had been instituted in 1934. The govern-
ment of the ROC strengthened martial law in 1949 and did not re-
peal it until July 1987.34
By 1985, the system of government of the ROC on Taiwan was
still only nominally democratic. The Soviet support given to the
KMT in the 1920s was still visible in the authoritarian, one-party
state in power on Taiwan. The legitimacy of the KMT regime on
Taiwan formally rests on its claim to be the sole legitimate govern-
ment of all China and its stated intention to retake the mainland.
With the passing decades of exile on Taiwan, the continued authority
and legitimacy of KMT rule has come to depend more on providing
the people of Taiwan with a rising standard of living and less on re-
pression.35 Edwin Winckler, an American political scientist specializ-
ing in ROC politics, characterized the regime in Taiwan as
"gerontocratic-authoritarian" because for almost forty years the
reins of power remained firmly in the hands of the aging technocratic
and military elite of KMT members who fled mainland China in
1949.36 Nevertheless, Winckler believes that the 1980s are a period
30 M. HANE, JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 355 (1972).
31 See G. KERR, FORMOSA BETRAYED 254-310 (1965); Shin, Haunted by the Past, FAR E.
EcoN. REV., Mar. 10, 1988, at 36. "Formosan leaders in exile charge that more than
10,000 were slaughtered in the month of March. I must assume that there could not have
been less than 5,000 and I am inclined to accept the higher figure." G. KERR, supra at 310.
32 U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, COUNTRY LAW STUDY FOR THE ROC 19 (July
1959).
"33 Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion, 1 A
COMPILATION OF THE LAWS OF THE ROC 43-44 (1971).
34 Goldstein, Retaining the Edge, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 9, 1987, at 24.
35 See T. GOLD, TlE STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE 125 (1986).
36 Winckler, Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritari-
anism?, 99 THE CHINA Q. 481, 482 (1984).
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of generational succession in which a younger, less dogmatic elite is
coming to power within the KMT.3 7 During this period of succes-
sion, Winckler predicts a general trend towards liberalization of the
political system, punctuated by periods of inconsistency and uncer-
tainty while control over policy slowly shifts.38
The executive branch of government, the KMT, the armed
forces, and the security forces which administered martial law are
effectively in control of political power in the ROC today. The one-
party form of government and martial law have diminished the im-
portance of the legislative and judicial branches of government. 39 In
addition, under the ROC Constitution the legislature has no power
to propose legislation, but can only review and amend bills proposed
by the executive branch.40
The judicial branch is patterned on the civil law model, with a
very narrowly defined power to make law or exercise constitutional
review.4 1 A shortage of lawyers and government personnel assigned
to policing frustrates the enforcement of existing laws and economic
regulations. The shortage of legal and administrative agency per-
sonnel is compounded by a lack of effective tools for enforcing regu-
lations. Nothing in ROC law corresponds to the U.S. administrative
law cease and desist order, which allows agency personnel to identify
violations of regulations, issue warnings, and proceed with criminal
prosecutions for further violations once a warning has been issued.42
The lack of a system for reporting cases further limits judicial
law making in the ROC. Court records of litigation are accessible
only to parties and their counsel. Although appellate and Supreme
Court cases are reported, they are not binding precedent unless a
special committee of the Supreme Court designates them as such.
This committee convenes only about every five years.43
3. Economic Development and Business Practices
The economic miracle the ROC has enjoyed since the 1960s is
due at least in part to economic planning and incentives for develop-
ment which the central government initiated. The administration of
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Since the late 1970s, the opposition to the KMT has been increasingly active in
Taiwan and even formed an unofficial opposition party. There were indications that, in
1987, the opposition to the KMT would be allowed to form an officially recognized oppo-
sition party. Although martial law was repealed in 1987, it was replaced by a National
Security Law that reimposed some of the features of martial law.
40 ROC CONST. arts. LVII(I) & LXIII.
41 A. VON MEHREN &J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAw 1142-45 (2d ed. 1977).
42 For example, in the U.S. bankruptcy context, "[t]he Court may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [Title
11]." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
43 Baker & McKenzie, Taiwan Newsletter, April-June 1987, at 11.
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U.S. aid by the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in the
early 1950s began the economic planning process in Taiwan.44 By
the late 1950s, the aid had helped the government establish a formal
economic plan. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the ROC made a
series of farsighted and highly successful reforms in the tax code and
regulation of foreign investment to encourage the growth of Tai-
wan's export industries. 45
Officials describe economic planning in Taiwan as "indicative,"
designed to provide support for a free enterprise economy and not
in any sense compulsory. Direct central government involvement in
the economy of Taiwan, particularly in the form of government-
owned enterprises, however, is fairly substantial. This direct govern-
ment intervention may be justified by referring to the economic phi-
losophy of Dr. Sun.4 6 Dr. Sun's philosophy, which he expressed in
"Three Principles of the People," includes the principle of "peoples'
livelihood" or the obligation of the government to provide for the
material well being of the people of China.47
The ROC Constitution affirms that the "Three Principles of the
People" are the basis of the government of the ROC.48 The central
government, therefore, has a constitutional mandate to take positive
steps to manage the economy and control economic development
for the benefit of all the citizens of the ROC. Government ownership
,of almost all major banks is an example of where the "Three Princi-
ples of the People" guide and legitimate government economic
intervention.
Although central government intervention in the economy of
Taiwan is substantial, many government-owned companies are in ef-
fect public utilities.49 Since the 1950s, the private sector of the econ-
omy of Taiwan has grown relative to the public sectors and now
accounts for more than eighty-seven percent of industrial produc-
tion.50 As much as ninety percent of the private sector of the ROC
consists of small and medium businesses which are often family
owned. 51 A very free-wheeling laissez-faire capitalism prevails, espe-
cially in the part of the private sector dominated by small and me-
dium businesses. Firms face intensely competitive conditions.
44 See N. JACOBY, U.S. AID TO TAIWAN 32 (1966).
45 S. Kuo, G. RANIS &J. FEI, THE TAIWAN SUCCESS STORY: RAPID GROWTH WITH IM-
PROVED DISTRIBUTION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1952-1979, at 73-78 (1981).
46 HSIEH KWAN-SHENG, A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION 22-30 (1957).
47 Id.
48 ROC CONST. art. I.
49 State-owned companies in the ROC include Taipower, China Petroleum, Taiwan
Sugar, Taiwan Fertilizer, China Steel, China Shipbuilding, Taiwan Metal Mining, and
China Petrochemical Development. The trains, phone system, and post office are con-
trolled directly by the Ministry of Communications.
50 ROC 1986: A REFERENCE BOOK 209. In the 1950s, the private sector accounted
for less than half of industrial production.
51 Taiwan Survey, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 1988, at 11.
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In addition to the dozen or so nationalized industries, there are
also several major private companies in Taiwan today. Companies
commonly combine informally to form enterprise groups, although
ROC company law does not recognize conglomerates. 52 Some of
the leading enterprise groups in Taiwan rose to prominence by co-
operating with government officials to invest in industries targeted as
strategic under economic plans. 53 The largest enterprise group in
Taiwan, the Formosa Plastics group, achieved success by responding
to government calls for investment in the manufacture of certain
types of raw materials the plastics industry needed for development
in the early 1970s. 54
This cooperation between major local entrepreneurs and central
government planning officials has clearly been important in the eco-
nomic development of Taiwan. 55 Until recently, central government
bureaucrats undertook the central economic planning in the ROC
with a minimum of discussion and cooperation with business
representatives .56
The government supported this system of indicative economic
planning indirectly through encouragement in the form of tax incen-
tives. Indicative economic planning combined with limited direct
government ownership of industry and an unruly, effectively unregu-
lated private sector has complemented the political divisions of
power in Taiwan. The ROC gave many mainlanders who arrived in
Taiwan in 1949 positions in government or government-owned in-
dustries. 57 For many years, Taiwanese participation in central gov-
ernment was very limited. 58 The grant of economic freedom,
however, compensated the local population in some sense for the
denial of political rights.
The failure of central government economic planning to reach
52 Chuang, Legal Aspects of Relationships of Enterprise Groups in Taiwan 7 (1986)
(S.J.D. thesis, U.C.-Berkeley). See also infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
53 T. GOLD, supra note 35, at 83.
54 Two of the corporate reorganization case studies at the end of this article, Delta
Petrochemical and Ta Nun, involved companies which received government monopoly
licenses in the 1970s as part of a program to foster the development of domestic industries
in Taiwan. See the Delta Petrochemical and Ta Nun case studies at the end of this article.
55 This cooperation, however, does not approach the degree of cooperation between
government and industry found in Japan and Korea. The ROC has no conglomerates
which approach the magnitude or importance of the Japanese or Korean trading conglom-
erates which combine international marketing, production, and financial operations.
56 Interview with Su Han-Ming, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Interna-
tional Commercial Bank of China, in Taipei (Apr. 1986).
57 J. FAIRBANK, E. REISCHAUER & A. CRAIG, EAST ASIA: TRADITION & TRANSFORMATION
937 (1973).
58 This began to change in the 1970s. The process of greater Taiwanese participa-
tion in a government controlled by the KMT and mainlanders has been further accelerated
with the formation of an opposition party in 1986, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP).
Although the formation of an opposition party is still officially banned, the DPP has been
tolerated by the authorities and allowed to take seats in the legislature.
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very deeply into many aspects of private sector economic activity has
contributed to the development of a large unregulated money mar-
ket in the ROC.59 Another contributing factor was the tight money
conditions prevailing throughout the 1960s and 1970s in Taiwan,
which caused the demand for credit to exceed the amount regulated
banks and financial institutions could provide. Many forms of finan-
cial transactions in the unregulated money market take place be-
tween friends and relatives based upon mutual trust.60
Many businesses in Taiwan fail to maintain accurate financial
records. 6' While relaxed bookkeeping practices may be due in part
to a lack of financial sophistication among small and medium busi-
nesses, the practices are also due to efforts to evade business taxes. 62
The tax code indirectly condones the failure to keep accurate finan-
cial records. It provides that where a business' records are so incom-
plete that the tax inspectors cannot accurately assess the tax liability,
the tax inspectors may simply levy taxes based on the average rate of
profit for that industry.63 The unfortunate result has been that many
local businesses have failed to develop and maintain reliable ac-
counting systems. 64 According to a U.S. businessman in Taiwan,
during the years of Taiwan's tremendous economic success, many
businesses were happy to pay taxes at an artificially low average rate
of profit because their actual profits were usually well in excess of
that rate.65
The lack of an efficient credit reporting system as well as irregu-
lar accounting practices within firms and ready access to working
capital through informal and unregulated sources, which are often
not reported in full company accounts, have hindered the develop-
ment of a sound financial market in Taiwan. Until very recently, in-
formation about borrowers was very difficult or impossible to obtain.
For example, even though the MOEA requires companies to file cer-
59 Kaufman-Winn, Decriminalizing Bad Checks Should Help to Rationalize Taiwan's Finan-
cial System, 8 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 9, 20 (Aug. 15, 1986).
60 CHINA ECON. NEWS, Jan. 28, 1985, at 6. Commonly, a credit lottery (or piao hui in
Chinese) is set up between neighbors or people who work together. For example, each of
twenty members will contribute the equivalent of U.S. $100 every month. In return, each
member will receive the collected sum once during the life of the hui. Surveys indicate that
up to 85% of the public in Taiwan participates in piao hui and most participants never
request any written evidence of obligation or collateral. Members may participate in the
hui as a form of saving, or may initiate a hui to raise money for business or personal use.
Id.
61 S. Champion, American Bankers' Comments on Accounting and Auditing Stan-
dards in Taiwan (undated, unpublished report on file with the N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.).
62 This problem is by no means unique to Taiwan, but is probably endemic in devel-
oping countries. See generally Wilson and McBride, The Fictions and Figures in the Company
Books, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 8, 1978, at 43.
63 ROC Income Tax Law art. 83.
64 Interview with William M. Foley, partner, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., in Taipei
(Mar. 1986).
65 See, supra note I regarding confidential sources.
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tain information concerning promoters and capitalization when seek-
ing permission to incorporate, this most minimal information is not
available to interested parties without a court order.66 Because court
records are not a matter of public record, even information about
prior judgments against a prospective borrower might be difficult to
obtain.
Since the 1970s, the authorities have taken several steps to re-
duce the importance of the unregulated money market and to pro-
mote sound credit practices. In the late 197 0s, the ROC established
"bills finance houses" to create a regulated commercial paper market
and to get major companies out of the unregulated money market.6 7
In 1986, in an effort to diminish reliance on postdated checks as a
credit instrument, the ROC government eliminated criminal penal-
ties for bouncing checks. 68 Postdated checks have been enormously
important in the unregulated money market. 6 9 The business com-
munity viewed the removal of criminal penalties as a dramatic official
step to undermine the security of transactions in that market and to
pressure businessmen to turn to regulated sources of finance. 70
The ROC authorities have not yet effectively addressed one ma-
jor factor contributing to the growth of the unregulated money mar-
ket: the inability of overregulated, bureaucratic government-owned
banks to meet the legitimate demand for credit in Taiwan. The Eco-
nomic Reform Committee (ERC) 7 1 recommended more consistent
enforcement of existing regulations, less central government inter-
ference in the day-to-day management of the government-owned
banks, and the licensing of additional privately owned banks. 7 2 As of
1987, no positive steps had been taken since the ERC report to im-
plement any of these reforms.
66 Shen, Bad Check Decriminalization Boosts Credit Information Business, in FINANCIAL AND
INVESTMENT YEARBOOK ROC 1987, at 43.
67 R. Ho, The Financial System in Taiwan, ROC, Its Function and Operation 22-25
(Oct. 1981) (unpublished report on file with the N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.).
68 Kaufman-Winn, supra note 59, at 9.
69 Many transactions in the unregulated money market are not documented at all and
are supported by the existence of family or close social connections between the parties.
With the growth of the unregulated money market since the 1960s, however, not all trans-
actions can depend on personal relationships for security. By requiring postdated checks
as security for credit in the unregulated money market, unregulated lenders could use the
criminal penalties as a cheap, efficient method of securing and enforcing their credits.
When the authorities administered the criminal penalties, they were in effect intervening
in the unregulated money market on behalf of unregulated lenders.
70 Kaufman-Winn, supra note 59, at 19.
71 The Economic Reform Committee was established in 1985 to look into the causes
of the Cathay scandal and make suggestions on what improvements were needed in the
ROC's current economic and financial system. Goldstein, In Exchange for What?: Taiwan
Debates Benefits of Freer Currency Movements, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 3, 1985, at 67; Goldstein,
The Never-Ending Story: More Nasty Suprises in Taiwan's Cathay Banking Scandal, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Sept. 12, 1985, at 93.
72 Liang Kuo-Shu, Financial Reforms Recommended by the Economic Reform Committee, ROC,
INDUSTRY OF FREE CHINA, Mar. 1986, at 7.
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The government considers employees of government-owned
banks in the ROC to be civil servants and consequently subjects
them to a draconian system of bureaucratic regulation. 73 In addition
to regulations administered by the Ministry of Finance and the Cen-
tral Bank of China, individual bank employees are subject to a special
investigatory branch of government, the Control Yuan. The Control
Yuan investigates losses of public property. 74 The Control Yuan de-
fines all public deposits with state-owned banks as "public property"
so that any loss of principal of a loan becomes a matter for investiga-
tion and assignment of fault.75 Individual bank officers face adminis-
trative sanctions for any loans they make which later become
nonperforming. 76 This concern over possible personal liability is a
powerful disincentive inhibiting the exercise of business judgment
within the government-owned banks. Bankers focus instead on the
value of collateral and try to avoid any unsecured lending. The lack
of accurate financial records further encourages the conservatism of
lending officers, who prefer to lend only when real property or fixed
assets can be offered as collateral. This pawn shop mentality is per-
fectly rational given the system of bank regulation and general stan-
dard of financial accounting, but the resulting restriction of bank
credit forces many businessmen into the unregulated money market
for working capital. The elimination of the unregulated market is
only possible when the government allows regulated financial insti-
tutions the freedom to set their own'interest rates and lending poli-
cies and to meet a greater proportion of existing demand for credit.
B. A Comparison of U.S. and ROC Company Law
Judges in the Anglo-American tradition have considerable dis-
cretion to make new common law and to overrule or significantly
reinterpret statutes. Civilian judges in the ROC, by contrast, are
confined to applying the law as the legislature has written it. While
courts in the United States can remedy statutory deficiencies by cre-
ating new common law, ROC judges are relatively powerless to do
the same. Judges in the Anglo-American tradition not only have the
power to create new common law, they also enjoy the power to de-
cide cases on general principles of equity or fairness. 7 The equita-
ble powers of U.S. courts have been very important in the historical
73 Id. at 9.
74 Interview with Keng Ping, Executive Vice-President of the Bank of Communica-
tions, in Taipei (July 1986).
75 If the Control Yuan defined "public property" in the government-owned banking
context as the capital of the bank, individual bank officers would have no problems with
investigations from losses of public property. Id.
76 Id.
77 A. VON MEHREN &J. GORDLEY, supra note 41, at 1129-45.
[VOL. 13
CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TAIWAN
development of U.S. company law. Nothing in the ROC corre-
sponds to the Anglo-American tradition of equity jurisdiction.
The court-ordered reorganization of financially distressed com-
panies is one aspect of the regulation of corporate financial transac-
tions. Differences between the conduct of court-ordered
reorganizations in the United States and ROC stem not only from
different systems for handling creditors' rights and business insol-
vencies, but also from different systems of company law and eco-
nomic regulation. 78
1. U.S. Company Law
In the nineteenth century in the United States, each state at-
tempted to regulate closely the granting of corporate charters. 79
Corporations could be formed only by a special act of the state legis-
lature and were granted limited powers. Courts could severely limit
activities outside that grant of powers ("Ultra vires" acts). This for-
mer system of court limitation of the scope of corporate charters is
similar to the present system in the ROC as administered by MOEA.
MOEA grants company licenses only for specifically authorized busi-
ness activities.80
Following the Civil War in the United States in 1865, corporate
economic activity exploded. By 1900 most states had given up trying
to limit the activities of corporations. The existence of many differ-
ent state governments in competition with each other for tax reve-
nues made this revolution in U.S. company law possible. Many states
offered companies low tax rates and lax legal regulations in an at-
tempt to bring corporate investment and tax revenue into their states
from other states. 81 This "race to the bottom" of deregulation by
state governments gave company management wide powers at the
expense of protections for shareholders and creditors of
companies .82
78 An important feature necessary for understanding the regulation of corporate fi-
nance in the United States is the division of the U.S. legal system into a federal system
which applies to the whole nation, and individual state systems which apply only to resi-
dents of each state. The ROC does not have any such division into national and local legal
systems.
79 See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 511-12 (2d ed. 1985).
80 Correspondence with David Chang to Jane Kaufman Winn (Dec. 7, 1988); See gener-
ally infra p. 000.
Art. 16 of the Company Law provides that:
Unless guarantee services are rendered in accordance with other applicable
laws or its articles of incorporation, a company shall not act as a surety or
guarantor in any manner whatsoever. The responsible person(s) of the com-
pany who violates [this] provision.., shall not only be personally responsible
for such surety or guaranty obligation, but also (severally) fined not more
than twenty thousand yuan and liable to the company for any damage so
incurred.
81 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 79, at 524.
82 But see Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923 (1984)
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The equity powers of U.S. courts also played a role in the devel-
opment of company law. Anglo-American company law has many
roots in trust law.8 3 During much of the nineteenth century, courts
used their equitable powers to treat management of companies like
trustees for the interests of minority shareholders and creditors.8 4
With the collapse of state statutory regulations, however, the courts
also abandoned efforts to control many abuses by management.8 5 At
this time states eliminated many provisions similar to current ROC
provisions concerning legal capital requirements, limitations on
holding stock in other companies, and the payment of dividends.
Following the stock market crash of 1929 and during the Great
Depression of the 1930s, the federal government stepped in to take
responsibility for regulating U.S. securities markets. A regulatory
philosophy of full and fair disclosure combined with decentralized
decision making lay behind many major reforms of the 1930s. This
emphasis on governmental supervision of disclosure while allowing
the parties, such as creditors and shareholders, to police the actual
conduct of company management makes the free flow of reliable in-
formation an essential factor in the U.S. system of economic
regulation.
States never returned to the attempt to regulate directly the con-
duct of management through such means as limiting the use of hold-
ing companies, the scope of authorized business activities, or the
setting of minimum capital requirements. Because many state gov-
ernments do not actively regulate the conduct of company manage-
ment, the powers of U.S. courts to protect minority shareholders and
creditors based on equitable principles of fairness remain important.
2. ROC Company Law
The Company Law of the ROC was first promulgated under the
Ch'ing dynasty in 1904 and was based on German company law.8 6
The ROC government added a chapter dealing with court-ordered
company reorganizations in 1966, which it modeled on both U.S.
and Japanese company reorganization laws.8 7
Many provisions of the current ROC Company Law seem to in-
(discussing the underlying political vision that states demonstrated by repealing limita-
tions on corporate activities).
83 Civil law has no equivalent of trust law. The common law idea of a trust was bor-
rowed from Anglo-American law in the early 1970s to create "trust and investment compa-
nies," companies invented by Taiwanese financial authorities in an effort to increase the
volume of long-term investment.
84 See Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L.
REV. 173, 207 (1986).
85 Id. at 214-16.
86 Lai In-Jaw, Legal Problems of Parent-Subsidiay Corporations, in TRADE AND INVESTMENT
IN TAIWAN 745, 753-54 (2d ed. 1985).
87 LIN MING-HUA, TREATISE ON COMPANY REORGANIZATION LAW i (1984) (in Chinese).
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dicate policies favoring sound financial management of incorporated
businesses with limited liabilities. 88 The actual provisions of the
ROC Company Law are generally more conservative than the similar
provisions of company law in most states in the United States. The
formal provisions of the law, however, are often undermined by er-
ratic enforcement or restrictive judicial interpretations.8 9 Company
management is too often not accountable to minority shareholders
or creditors. Existing company law, therefore, offers little relief.
This potential abuse of control by management of viable companies
corresponds to the inability of creditors to effectively control man-
agement during court-ordered reorganizations.
Many provisions of the ROC Company Law strictly regulate the
financial structure of companies. For example, companies are re-
quired to retain ten percent of any net profits in a legal reserve until
the accumulated legal reserve equals the stated capital of the firm. 90
Companies are forbidden to lend money to shareholders or to
purchase their own shares. 9' The enforcement of these require-
ments, however, is so lax that the protections they offer creditors or
minority shareholders are not meaningful. 92 Even sophisticated
creditors may be at a loss to obtain accurate information concerning
the financial structure of a company. Without such information the
enforcement of particular legal obligations is impossible.
The ROC Company Law includes provisions for a "supervisor,"
a position which does not exist within Anglo-American company
law. 93 The supervisor, like the board and officers of a company, is a
"responsible person" under the ROC Company Law and may be lia-
ble for breach of duties of care and loyalty to the company.94 As has
happened in Germany, the company supervisor in the ROC is often
captured by the board and does not effectively supervise manage-
ment. This problem is mirrored in the inability of reorganization su-
88 E.g., ROC Company Law arts. 131 (initial issues of shares must be fully paid), 156
(regulatory authority may set minimum capital requirement), 218 (supervisor authorized
to examine books), 237 (10% of net profits must be set aside as legal reserve prior to
declaring dividend), 15 (company prohibited from lending to shareholders), 167 (com-
pany prohibited from purchasing its own shares except in very limited circumstances), and
247 (limitations on the amount of debt the corporation can incur) [hereinafter Company
Law].
89 See Chuang, supra note 52; Lai supra note 86, at 761.
90 Company Law arts. 232, 237.
91 Id. at arts. 15, 167.
92 Chuang, supra note 52, at 236; see generally infra p. 420.
93 Wang, Company Law of the ROC, in TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN TAIWAN 511, 542-43
(2d ed. 1985).
94 Company Law art. 216 provides for the election of a supervisor by shareholders.
The supervisor reviews the financial statements and business operation of the company
and generally supervises management for the benefit of shareholders. Article 23 of the
Company Law provides that any "responsible person" (defined in Article 8) may be jointly
liable with the company for any harm done to third parties.
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pervisors to exercise any control over the conduct of reorganization
managers.
ROC Company Law has no provisions to effectively regulate
conglomerates or enterprise groups. 95 Article 13 of the Company
Law limits the direct investment by one company in the shares of
another to forty percent of the stated capital of the investing com-
pany. While this restriction is based on a desire to limit, if not actu-
ally prohibit, the formation of holding companies, groups of
informally affiliated companies doing business are increasingly the
norm in the ROC today. 96
The narrow formalism of ROC courts in interpreting existing
law had compounded the failure to make any statutory provision to
protect creditors or minority shareholders of companies affiliated
with enterprise groups. In China Credit Information Service v. Taipei Bu-
reau of National Taxation,97 the Taipei Tax Collection Office held that
two separate companies were in substance one company. The tax
collection office found that the two companies in question used the
same office and the same bank account. 98 It also found that the com-
panies recorded transactions with third parties in the same books.
Both companies were run by the same person and had almost identi-
cal shareholders. Based on these facts, the tax collection office held
that the two companies were one enterprise for tax purposes. The
Administrative Court heard the case on appeal and overruled the
Tax Collection Office decision because the two companies were sep-
arately incorporated at the MOEA. 99 It held that the interlocking
boards and. shareholders, and commingling of funds, were not suffi-
cient to establish that the two companies were a single enterprise. 00
Until recently the MOEA granted companies a limited scope of
authorized business activities at the time of incorporation. Any sig-
nificant expansion of business operations required application to the
MOEA to amend the authorized scope of business activities. The
MOEA generally prohibited companies from giving corporate guar-
antees because the MOEA refused to include the power to give guar-
antees in the activities authorized in a company license. Businesses
devised many creative legal maneuvers to circumvent this prohibi-
tion, such as joining the would-be guarantor to a negotiable instru-
ment as a co-maker or as maker while the recipient of the proceeds
95 Chuang, supra note 52. Chuang coined the term "enterprise group" based on his
translation of the Chinese expression kuan-hsi chi-yeh, which is literally "related compa-
nies." See also Lai In-Jaw, Legal Problems of Parent-Subsidiary Corporations in Taiwan
(S.J.D. thesis, Harvard Law School) (1981).
96 Chuang, supra note 52, at 11; Lai, supra note 86, at 755.
97 China Credit Information Serv. v. Taipei Bureau of Nat'l Taxation, 62 P'au Tzu
252 (1973), cited in Lai, supra note 86, at 757.
98 Id. at 758.
99 Id. at 759.
I00 Id. at 760.
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of the loan was joined as endorser. In 1983, the MOEA changed its
policy so that companies no longer needed authorization in their
company license to give guarantees if they were authorized to do so
by their charter and not otherwise prohibited by law. The proce-
dures used before 1984 to circumvent the prohibition, however,
caused many problems concerning primary and secondary liability
for obligations between parent and subsidiary corporations in the
context of corporate reorganizations, such as irregular transfers of
assets between corporations.
The lack of adequate protection for creditors under the Com-
pany Law or other regulations gave rise to a common practice among
creditors of requiring all principals of a company to personally guar-
antee major corporate obligations.10 1 The ROC Company Law does
not provide for piercing the corporate veil or holding majority share-
holders liable for company obligations under any circumstances.
Therefore, many creditors request the personal guarantees of direc-
tors, officers, and major shareholders at the time credit is
extended. 0 2
The picture which emerges of the ROC Company Law is a for-
mal body of law which strictly regulates corporate affairs in some ar-
eas while leaving others totally unregulated. Narrow judicial
interpretations of existing statutes combined with lax enforcement
have reduced many laws to empty formalities. The lack of effective
controls on the conduct of management in company law generally is
further reflected in the inability of courts and creditors to adequately
control the conduct of reorganization managers in company
reorganizations.
III. Policies Underlying Corporate Reorganization 10
Bankruptcy, or straight liquidation, is a procedure for the or-
derly distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets among creditors. 0 4
Corporate reorganization is more than a debt collection technique.
An additional objective of reorganization is the re-emergence of the
financially distressed company as a viable enterprise. 0 5 The insol-
vency of a company raises issues concerning the rights of individuals
such as the creditors, shareholders, management, and employees of
the company. In the aggregate, rules for distributing the costs of
corporate failures and reorganizations are an important dimension
101 Chuang, supra note 52, at 262.
102 Id.
103 Much of the information in this section was obtained from confidential sources. See
supra note 1.
104 Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE
L.J. 857, 893-95 (1982).
105 Gerdes, General Principles of Plans of Corporate Reorganization, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 39, 41-
42 (1940).
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of national economic policy. A look at the historical development of
company reorganization law in the United States shows how U.S.
courts and creditors have tried to resolve problems similar to those
faced in the ROC today.
A. Historical Background of U.S. Bankruptcy and
Reorganization Law
The equity powers of U.S. courts were important in the inven-
tion of the procedure for corporate reorganization. Bankruptcy, as a
procedure for dealing with insolvent debtors, existed as long ago as
1285 in England.106 Several U.S. colonial bankruptcy statutes were
in effect when the United States achieved independence from Eng-
land. Unlike the involuntary bankruptcy relief statutes in England at
that time, the colonial statutes were typically voluntary and provided
debtor, not creditor, relief. The U.S. Constitution gives bankruptcy
jurisdiction to the federal courts, not the state courts.10 7 For several
years following the adoption of the Constitution, however, Congress
failed to enact any bankruptcy law for the federal courts to apply.
Each year from 1789 to 1800 saw attempts to enact a U.S. bank-
ruptcy law.108 Congress adopted the first national bankruptcy law in
1800 following the financial panics of 1792 and 1797.109 Although
this law was intended to be a temporary five year measure, it survived
only three years before its repeal in 1803. Congress passed the next
bankruptcy law in 1841, but similarly repealed it less than two years
later due to increased opposition to discharging debtors through
bankruptcy.' 0 A third attempt lasted from 1867 to 1878."'
The U.S. economic boom and bust cycles in the late nineteenth
century forced courts to deal with the problems of insolvent rail-
roads. Public policy demanded that the railroads continue in opera-
tion for the benefit of the public, regardless of the interests of
shareholders and creditors. Railroads, however, had the most com-
plex financial structure of any corporate enterprises in the United
States at that time, often having many classes of bondholders hold-
ing first, second, third, and even fourth mortgages on assets." 12
Usually in the absence of any federal bankruptcy statute and without
any common law precedent, the courts used their equity jurisdiction
106 Dalhuisen, Historical Development of Bankruptcy Remedies, in EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY
LAW 1, 21 (1974).
107 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
108 9 Annals of Cong. 2649-77 (1799).
109 Bankrupt Act of April 4, 1800, 2 Stat. 19-36, repealed by Act of December 19, 1803,
ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248.
I 10 Bankrupt Act of August 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440-49, repealed by Act of March 3,
1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.
1 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by 20 Stat. 99 (1878); see also P. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS IN AMERICA 18-28 (1974).
112 Gerdes, supra note 105, at 40.
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to create the equity receivership procedure."l 3
Under this procedure, the courts turned over the assets of the
company to a receiver, who was similar to a bankruptcy trustee."
14
Different groups of creditors formed different protective commit-
tees.115 The receiver organized a sale of all the productive assets of
the railroad in order to pay off the creditors. The court set an upset
price below which the parties could not conclude the sale.'16 In real-
ity, the only buyers for the railroad's assets were those among the
creditors themselves who incorporated a new company to receive the
assets.11 7 The protective committees negotiated the terms of the re-
organization plan."" Under the plan, the court allowed creditors
who stood to recover something from the old company to convert
their claims against the old company into stock or bonds in the new
company.1 9 Preferred stock was an invention of these early equita-
ble reorganizations, given in exchange for bonds in the insolvent
company. The essence of this reorganization process was the sale of
the company's assets to its creditors.
Court supervision of the process was minimal. Beyond setting
the minimum upset price, courts deferred to the principle of creditor
control. This deference opened the door for existing management
and their investment bankers to usurp the process at the expense of
the investing public and small creditors. 120 Management and their
investment bankers could manipulate the protective committees for
their own benefit. 121 Small creditors were denied any hearing for
their grievances and generally were denied any recovery as well. 122
Courts often set the upset price at a low amount which did not pro-
tect unsecured creditors from overreaching by shareholders. 123 The
reorganization process was characterized by exorbitant costs due to
complex legal procedures and fees charged by various participants,
11S The following discussion is based on Fuller, The Background and Techniques of Equity
and Bankruptcy Railroad Reorganizations-A Survey, 7 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377 (1940).
114 Id. at 378.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 382.
117 Id. at 382, n.15.
118 Id. at 381-82.
119 Id. at 382.
120 A national securities market had begun to emerge by the late nineteenth century in
the United States. As a result, many small creditors were bondholders. This contrasts
sharply with the recent experience in the ROC where the corporate bond market is very
underdeveloped and bond holders are not a significant class of creditors in any major
reorganizations. Corporations in the ROC tend to rely for capital on a combination of
bank credit, the organized commercial paper market, and the unregulated money market,
instead of an organized securities market. Interview with Tracy Cheng, supra note 2.
121 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION
OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMITTEES, Part I, 863 et seq. (1937) [hereinafter SEC REPORT]. This monumental 8-part
study was 4,000 pages long.
122 See generally Fuller, supra note 113.
123 Id. at 383-84.
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including legal counsel to the protective committees, reorganization
managers, and mortgage trustees.
In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Boyd, 124 a railroad that had cost
$241,000,000 to build and was mortgaged for $157,000,000, was
sold for $61,000,000 in reorganization. The low sale price effectively
denied unsecured creditors any recovery. 125 Secured creditors and
the management of the insolvent company, acting through the credi-
tors' committee, then issued stock and bonds in the new company
worth $345,000,000 which the management recorded as fully
paid.' 26 An unsecured creditor tried to assert his claim against the
reorganized company. 127 The Supreme Court held that the un-
secured creditor could collect his claim from the reorganized com-
pany where the reorganization plan had allowed the stockholders
from the old company to participate, but had not allowed unsecured
creditors of the old company to recover.' 28
Following the Boyd case, judicial inquiry into the fairness of reor-
ganization plans grew slowly.129 The fairness of proposed reorgani-
zation plans could be litigated in the foreclosure proceedings. 130
The Boyd fairness doctrine allowed courts to prevent the most obvi-
ous fraudulent excesses by management and investment bankers.
Many abuses of equity receiverships, however, were not effectively
stopped until the 1930s when Congress reformed the U.S. securities
and banking law.13 ' As part of the reforms, Congress established the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and enacted federal se-
curities market regulations. 132 The reforms broke investment bank
control of industrial companies through interlocking directorships.
One of the major initiatives the newly founded SEC undertook
was an investigation into the abuses of creditors' committees during
the court supervised reorganization process. 133 This investigation
culminated in the company reorganization provisions of the Chan-
dler Act of 1938.13 4
The Chandler Act added two new procedures for company reor-
124 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
125 Id. at 507.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 498. The claims of most unsecured creditors had been purchased by man-
agement during the reorganization process.
128 Id. at 508.
129 See Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, in
SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION 133,
142 et seq. (1931).
Iso Fuller, supra note 113, at 383.
131 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
132 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 131, at § 78-78kk.
I33 SEC REPORT, supra note 121, Parts I-VIII.
134 Chandler Act, Bankruptcy Revision of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (Title 11) (1938).
William O. Douglas led the investigation.
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ganization to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.135 One simple, informal
procedure, Chapter XI, applied to companies which did not have
many shareholders or bondholders. 136 The act created a more com-
plex procedure, Chapter X, for major publicly held companies. 137 In
the more complex form of reorganization, the act required the SEC
to. make an independent study of the reorganization plan and report
to the court on whether or not it was fair to small investors and
creditors. 13 8
Another reform inspired by the abuses of creditors' committees
was the establishment of clear rules of priorities to protect secured
and unsecured creditors from overreaching by management and
shareholders. 13 9 Doctrines like the absolute priority rule defined
and protected the property interests of secured creditors.140 Under
the absolute priority rule,' 4 ' no junior creditors or shareholders
could recover anything until all senior classes had recovered in full.
When Congress passed the Chandler Act, the investment banking
community and its lawyers complained that judicial absolutism was
being substituted for the democratic principle of creditor control. 4 2
An exhaustive study by the SEC, however, clearly showed that the
former system allowing parties freedom to negotiate had been any-
thing but democratic.' 4 3
The Chandler Act reforms provided for the enforcement of
these and other rules by greater court involvement in all phases of
the reorganization process.' 4 4 In addition, SEC intervention was
mandatory in those cases involving major publicly held
companies.1 45
While the Chandler Act represented a great step forward in
curbing the abuses of the system prevailing before the 1930s, many
of the reforms ultimately proved too rigid to work in a variety cases.
For example, cases became bogged down in litigation to determine
whether the company could proceed with the simpler Chapter XI
process, or would have to submit to Chapter X. SEC supervision
135 Id.; Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544.
136 11 U.S.C. §§ 707-799 (repealed in 1978).
'7 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-576 (repealed in 1978).
138 11 U.S.C. § 572 (repealed in 1978).
139 11 U.S.C. § 597 (repealed in 1978).
140 Id.
141 The absolute priority rule applied only to Chapter X proceedings. In Chapter XI
proceedings the court could not affect the rights of secured creditors. S. DONNELLY, BANK-
RuVrcY, ARRANGEMENTS AND REORGANIZATIONS 114 (1972). In this respect, Chapter XI
resembles the ROC Bankruptcy Law, under which security interests are exempt from
bankruptcy administration. ROC Bankruptcy Law art. 108 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Law].
142 See, e.g., Blum, The Chandler Act and the Courts, 27 A.B.A.J. 232 (1941).
143 See, e.g., Burke, The Chandler Act and the Courts: A Reply, 27 A.B.A.J. 237 (1941).
144 Id. at 239.
14.5 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (repealed in 1978).
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proved expensive and cumbersome. The Chandler Act did not elim-
inate all abuses by powerful creditors and insiders.
In 1978, Congress extensively revised the Bankruptcy Act. 146
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code now has only one form of com-
pany reorganization, which combines features of both forms of reor-
ganization available under the Chandler Act, and eliminates all
mandatory supervision of reorganizations by the SEC. 14 7
Some of the 1978 reforms dealt with balancing the interests of
dissenting creditors and the interests of parties who were willing to
adopt a plan of reorganization. The reforms introduced complex
"cram down" provisions, which allowed debtors to force creditors to
accept a plan if certain conditions were met. 148 These provisions
were an attempt to replace the veto power given in 1938 to small
creditors with objective standards which when met allow the reor-
ganization to proceed over their objection. In addition, the reforms
abandoned the rigid form of the "absolute priority" rule which had
been applied in Chapter X cases. 149
Under the Chandler Act shareholders could not participate in
the reorganization plan unless the debtor company fully compen-
sated "creditors' prior rights."' 150 This rule applied even in cases
where most creditors felt existing management might perform better
if given some equity participation in the reorganized company.151
Under the 1978 Act, however, creditors can now waive the absolute
priority rule by requisite vote and allow shareholder participation, if
they find it to their own advantage to do so, provided that the parties
fully disclose the details of the transaction prior to acceptance of the
plan. The absolute priority rule continues to apply only where the
proponents of a plan seek to get court approval of it over the objec-
tion of a class of creditors.152
B. Policies of ROC Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law
During a period of rapid economic change and development like
that which the ROC has enjoyed for the last thirty years, formal stat-
utory law often cannot keep up with the changing social and eco-
146 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-109, 326 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
147 I1 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1982). The SEC, however, still retains the right to raise and
be heard on any issue in a reorganization case. B. WEINTRAUB, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL
§ 8.15 (1986).
148 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); E. WARREN &J. WESTBROOK, THE
LAW oiF DEBTORS & CREDITORS 608 (1986).
149 11 U.S.C. § 112 9 (a)( 8 ) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
150 6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 10.03 (14th ed.),
151 See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Metropolitan
Holding Co. v. Weadock, 113 F.2d 207 (1940); Swanson v. Barclay Park Corp., 90 F.2d
595 (1937).
152 This is by the cram down provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). D. COWANS, COWANS
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 20.26, p. 334-39 (1986).
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nomic realities. Consideration of the general policies underlying any
statutory debtor relief such as a corporate reorganization law helps
clarify the weaknesses of the existing ROC reorganization statute
and identify the directions any reform should take. It also highlights
areas in which lawmakers in the United States and ROC are pursuing
different policy objectives.
1. Fraudulent and Nonfraudulent Insolvency
Any statutory grant of debtor relief requires concessions from
creditors to be effective. Therefore, any such statute must also pro-
vide for enough supervision of the debtor to prevent abuse of bene-
fits conferred by the statute. Any statute that fails to distinguish
between fraudulent and nonfraudulent 'conduct by the debtor seek-
ing relief acts as an open invitation to debtor misconduct.' 53
U.S. company reorganization law provides a variety of legal doc-
trines to prevent fraudulent misconduct by debtors seeking relief.
Fraudulent conveyance law prohibits debtors from making gratui-
tous transfers to the detriment of creditors.154 The law of voidable
preferences prohibits debtors from unfairly discriminating on the
eve of bankruptcy between creditors with similar legal entitle-
ments.' 55 Shareholders who use the legal fiction of incorporation in
a manner contrary to public policy may be found personally liable for
corporation debts under the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil.' 56 Where creditors have taken advantage of their position as
insiders to secure advantages over other creditors, a court might
subordinate their claims to those of similar creditors under the doc-
S53 In Essentials of Bankruptcy: Prevention of Fraud and Control of Debtor, 23 VA. L. REV. 373
(1937), Professor Garrard Glenn observed that:
There is always the fraudulent debtor, and, to meet his case, bankruptcy re-
quires a controllable debtor. Hence the bankrupt must do two things. He
must give full discovery, that is, he must tell the truth about his estate and
doings; and, in order to insure this, the debtor must surrender to the court,
not only his estate if he has any, but also himself. Such is the method by
which fraud can be detected and creditors will get their due.
Id. at 378.
Glenn was criticizing an attempt at a corporate reorganization statute in effect from
1933 to 1938 which allowed "corporate officers and directors to help themselves from the
chest before the ship goes on the rocks." Id. at 375.
Professor Glenn, a legal historian, was disturbed by the fact that "[i]t never seemed to
have occurred to the [drafters of that corporate reorganization statute] ... that it is quite
possible for a corporation to be dishonest as well as poor" and observed that the illusion
that "an insolvent corporation always loves its creditors as itself" had resulted in egre-
gious fraud by the principals of corporations seeking reorganization. Id. at 374. He ar-
gued that while most debtors may be fair in their dealings with creditors, the problem of
dealing with the minority of debtors who try to defraud their creditors must always be
addressed in any form of statutory debtor relief.
154 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
155 1i U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
156 See, e.g., Alman v. Danin, 801 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
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trine of equitable subordination. 157 Where the business of affiliated
companies has been conducted to the unreasonable detriment of
some affiliates and the benefit of others, a court may consolidate the
separate corporate entities to protect creditors in the reorganization
of one of the affiliates under the doctrine of substantive
consolidation. 158,
Some statutory provisions similar to these U.S. doctrines exist in
the ROC. 15 The ROC could increase protection for creditors from
fraudulent misconduct on the part of debtors by adding statutory
provisions which do not currently exist under ROC law. Courts have
been either unwilling or unable to enforce the rights which, in the-
ory, creditors currently enjoy under the existing law. One problem
is the often unresponsive and formalistic interpretations courts give
statutes.' 60 Another problem is lack of discovery procedures'61 in
ROC courts which, when combined in many cases with the lack of
reliable company accounts or financial statements, presents creditors
with formidable problems in establishing the factual basis for
recovery.
2. Access to Reorganization Proceedings
While policymakers in both the United States and the ROC may
agree on the desirability of controlling fraudulent debtors, the differ-
ent national policies concerning economic planning and develop-
ment have produced different standards for allowing corporate
reorganizations in each country.
In the United States the consensus is that corporate reorganiza-
tion should proceed if it is expected to increase the total return to
creditors and shareholders by preserving the going concern value of
the company. 162 A court values a company by looking at a projected
return on investment and comparing that return with returns avail-
able in the capital markets for similar investments.' 63 No reorgani-
157 See, e.g., Wilson v. Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found.), 712 F.2d 206 (5th
Cir. 1983).
158 See, e.g., Evans Temple Church of God in Christ & Community Center, Inc. v. Car-
negie Body Co. (In re Evans Temple Church of God in Christ & Community Center, Inc.),
55 Bankr. 976 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
159 See, e.g., Company Law arts. 15 (prohibition on corporate lending to shareholders),
131 (initial issues of shares must be fully paid), 244 (fraudulent conveyance prohibition),
247 (limitations on amounts of corporate debt) and 267 (prohibition of purchases of cer-
tain outstanding shares).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 41-43 for a discussion of why this formalism
occurs.
161 A civil law system, such as exists in the ROC, gives the judge, not the parties, the
primary responsibility for collecting evidence. As a result, the ability of one party to com-
pel another party to a lawsuit to surrender relevant information is not very great in a civil
law system.
162 See T. EISENBERG, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 779 (1984).
163 Id.
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zation can continue without the debtor producing a plan which
meets the "feasibility" standard imposed by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. 164 The debtor has the absolute right to convert the reorgani-
zation to a liquidation.' 65 Creditors retain the right to convert the
proceeding into a straight liquidation if it becomes apparent that
more value is being lost by continuing the reorganization than could
be realized by an immediate sale of assets. 166 , If the majorities speci-
fied in section 1126(c) do not approve the debtor's reorganization
plan, conversion of the case to a liquidation is required. 167
Within the system of indicative economic planning and limited
direct government involvement, in the economy in the ROC, the
standards for allowing a major, publicly held company to proceed to
reorganization are unclear. Under existing procedures the courts
tend to defer to the judgment of the MOEA. The MOEA takes a
wide variety of economic and social variables into account, such as
export objectives, employment goals, and domestic production of
strategic materials, to name a few. Just as the standards for allowing
a reorganization to begin are not clearly defined, no clear basis exists
for making the decision to terminate a reorganization. The courts
have allowed many companies with no hope of regaining solvency to
linger on for years in reorganization proceedings.
While the emphasis by ROC officials on "soft" variables may
produce inefficient results, it is not unlike the Japanese style of eco-
nomic regulation which emphasizes social and cultural values more
than the reliance on financial valuation techniques used by creditors
in the United States.' 68 Unlike Japanese company reorganizations,
Chinese official intervention in reorganization proceedings has been
ad hoc and based on no clearly defined standards. The lack of coher-
ent policy objectives at the MOEA is further reflected in the lack of
government financial support for reorganizations once initiated.
This contrasts sharply with the Japanese system where the central
government strongly supports the banking system. 169 . Private banks
in Japan act as intermediaries between government agencies like the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and major cor-
porations. Once a commitment to a project has been made, ade-
quate resources to see the project to completion are made available
164 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982). See infra text accompanying note 320.
165 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); E. WARREN &J. WESTBROOK, supra
note 148, at 401.
166 i1 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See infra text accompanying notes
315-18.
167 E. WARREN &J. WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 401.
168 See C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL
POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982).
169 See Pascale and Rohlen, The Mazda Turnaround, 9 J. JAPANESE STUD. 219 (1983).
The responsibility for salvaging a failing company may still fall primarily on a private bank.
Id. at 231-33.
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from private or official sources. 170
3. Equal Treatment for Creditors
"Equality is equity" is a fundamental and overriding policy in
U.S. bankruptcy law. 17 ' This principle refers to relations between
creditors and between classes of creditors. While creditors who act
in concert are able to maximize the recovery of all creditors, any in-
dividual creditor has an incentive to try to increase his return by se-
curing preferential treatment. In reorganizations in the ROC, this
principle of equal treatment of creditors based on similar legal enti-
tlements is hardly seen as an issue- except among foreign bankers.
The relative indifference to principles like "treat like cases alike"
may derive in part from traditional Chinese ideas about law and cus-
tom.' 72 Westerners living in Taiwan believe that Chinese tend to
view the individuals involved in a dispute as more important than
abstract rights and principles. Cases which Americans view as similar
because they call for the application of similar legal doctrines, Chi-
nese participants may see as very different because of greater empha-
sis on the different facts of each case.
Creditors of an insolvent Taiwanese company may include em-
ployees, private lenders, trade creditors, local banks, and foreign
banks. The real problems come from private lenders 7T who do not
hesitate to use extralegal enforcement methods to the detriment of
regulated institutional lenders like banks.' 74 In their ability to take
advantage of their position as insiders, unregulated lenders in Tai-
wan enjoy an unfair advantage over regulated lenders. 175 Any con-
sideration of reforms of the ROC law should include proposals to
prevent manipulation by insiders like unregulated lenders.i 76
Foreign lenders are the group most at a disadvantage if a debtor
does not adequately respect legal entitlements. Foreign banks are
often outside the Chinese system of informal relationships and obli-
170 Id.
171 "[T]he principle that equality is equity... is the spirit of the bankrupt law." Cun-
ningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1923), quoted in Heyman v. Kemp (In re Teletronics,
Ltd.), 649 F.2d 1236, 1241 (7th Cir. 1981).
172 See supra text accompanying notes 3-11 for a discussion of Confucian attitudes to-
ward hierarchy and law.
173 See supra text accompanying notes 59-72 for a discussion of the unregulated money
market within which private lenders operate.
174 Winn, Security Interests Under the Laws of the ROC on Taiwan, 23 TExAs INT'L L.J. 395,
398 (1988).
175 This situation parallels nineteenth century railroad reorganizations in the United
States in which investment bankers as insiders enjoyed an unfair advantage over the invest-
ing public and small creditors. Reforms of the U.S. company reorganization procedures in
the 1930s focused on preventing manipulation by insiders like investment bankers. The
reforms included mandatory SEC participation in Chapter.X proceedings, appointment of
an independent trustee in most cases, and court approval of the reorganization plan.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 59-72 & 72-76 for a discussion of the unregu-
lated money market and investment bankers, respectively.
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gations which helps private lenders supplement their legal rights.
Foreign banks have also experienced difficulties articulating and lob-
bying for their interests as a group, which has increased their frustra-
tion with the court-ordered reorganization process in general. The
loudest calls for reform of the reorganization procedure and greater
equality in treatment for creditors with similar legal rights, therefore,
have come from the foreign banking community.
4. Maximize the Debtor's Estate
In the absence of any provision for the discharge or rehabilita-
tion of the debtor, the fundamental purpose of a bankruptcy proce-
dure is to maximize the recovery by creditors. The collection of all
the debtor's assets is an essential element in that procedure. A fur-
ther purpose in corporate reorganization is the rehabilitation of the
corporate debtor. Under U.S. law, however, that further purpose is
secondary to the fundamental purpose of helping creditors re-
cover.177 In a corporate reorganization the business is rehabilitated
because it is worth more to interested parties as a going concern
than the assets would bring in a liquidation sale.' 78
Preserving the value of the company includes taking prompt
steps if necessary to protect inventory, cash, and other assets from
dissipation.1 79 The debtor in possession or the reorganization man-
ager has a duty to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of
creditors while managing the business of the company undergoing
reorganization.' 80 To maximize the benefit to creditors, corporate
assets not essential to the current operations of the company in reor-
ganization may be sold. 181
Current ROC law does not clearly recognize the principle of
maximizing the value of the company for the benefit of creditors.
While courts consider petitions for reorganization, lengthy delays
may occur allowing unnecessary dissipation of company assets.
These assets are difficult to recover if the reorganization manager
and the supervisor do not act forcefully to recover assets fraudu-
lently or preferentially transferred to insiders prior to commence-
ment of the reorganization of the case. The ROC statute covering
company reorganizations does not distinguish between assets essen-
tial to the reorganization and nonessential assets which could be sold
during the reorganization. In Taiwan statutory reforms might im-
177 Jackson, supra note 104, at 857.
178 Gerdes, supra note 105, at 40.
179 This is achieved under U.S. bankruptcy law by the appointment of interim trustees
and examiners if necessary. See infra text accompanying notes 232-34.
180 Under U.S. bankruptcy law this is done by holding the debtor in possession to the
standards imposed on a trustee. See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
181 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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prove the conduct of court-ordered reorganizations by providing for
the release of nonessential assets at the request of creditors.
5. Harmonize Bankruptcy with Other Creditors' Remedies
The legal procedure used to enforce a right should not affect the
substance of the right enforced. If the substance of a right changes
depending on what enforcement procedure is used, then some par-
ties are given an incentive to choose one procedure, such as corpo-
rate reorganization, over another, such as bankruptcy, in order to
improve their personal position even though the choice of procedure
is otherwise inappropriate.
The failure to adequately protect creditors has given manage-
ment an incentive to seek reorganization simply to gain an advantage
over creditors without making a good faith effort to cooperate in the
reorganization. The rights of both secured and unsecured creditors
have not received the same protection within corporate reorganiza-
tions as they receive in other legal procedures, such as compulsory
execution.' 8 2 This practice undermines the public policy underlying
company reorganizations of helping major public companies over-
come temporary financial distress and returning them to
profitability.
The enforcement procedures available to creditors outside com-
pany reorganization differ significantly in the United States and the
ROC. A single unsecured creditor seeking judgment against a
debtor in the United States enjoys the benefit of some sort of supple-
mentary proceedings if the first attempt to execute on a judgment is
not successful. "Supplementary proceedings" are defined by the law
of each state, but generally provide creditors with an extra procedure
after the trial is over to compel the debtor to provide the court with
information about the debtor's assets.183 A debtor who fails to coop-
erate in supplementary proceedings can be held in contempt and
jailed. 18 4
No special procedure like this exists in the ROC. As a result,
unsecured creditors who fail to identify assets when credit is ex-
tended may find it difficult to locate them after a debtor has
defaulted.
If a debtor has defaulted on more than one unsecured obliga-
tion, the result under Anglo-American law is the "race to the court-
house." This race occurs because the first unsecured creditor to
obtain a judgment against the debtor is given a "judgment lien" on
182 This corresponds to the U.S. experience prior to Boyd. See supra text accompanying
notes 113-23.
183 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-352 (1983).
184 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-352.1 (1983).
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the debtor's property and thus has priority over other unsecured
creditors in the amount of the judgment.
Under the ROC Compulsory Execution Law, any unsecured
creditor who can demonstrate that a debtor will not have sufficient
assets left after judgment to satisfy that creditor's claim is allowed to
join an execution proceeding already begun by another unsecured
creditor. Allowing all other unsecured creditors to "piggyback" on
the execution by the first unsecured creditor prevents any "race to
the courthouse" by unsecured creditors in the ROC. On the con-
trary, unsecured creditors have a strong incentive to pursue compo-
sition or other informal solutions.
U.S. bankruptcy law also frustrates the race to the courthouse by
unsecured creditors by voiding transfers made during the ninety
days preceding bankruptcy.' 85 Both the debtor and any unsecured
creditors have the right to initiate bankruptcy and then to recover
assets taken by the first unsecured creditor to execute.' 86 Therefore,
even in the United States, the bankruptcy law actually encourages
any unsecured creditor who considers executing against the debtor's
property to enter into informal negotiations with the debtor and
other creditors.
Composition, a settlement between creditors, is one of the most
common forms of debtor relief in the ROC today. If the company
reorganization statute were simply repealed instead of being re-
formed, creditors of financially distressed corporations would proba-
bly rely on composition as a substitute for reorganization.187 Unlike
U.S. bankruptcy, composition under ROC law does not give the
debtor discharge as a matter of right. Creditors holding claims equal
to two-thirds of total claims must approve the debtor's proposed
plan for relief from his obligations.' 88 Secured creditors are exempt
from composition proceedings and never lose their right to enforce
their mortgage interest by execution.' 89
The ROC Bankruptcy Law provides that secured creditors are
exempt from bankruptcy proceedings. The pawn shop mentality of
many lenders' 90 has led to the practice-among borrowers of granting
security interests in all fixed assets of a company. Consequently,
very few insolvent companies have unencumbered assets for distri-
bution to unsecured creditors. As a result, unsecured creditors
185 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
186 The trustee can only reeover such assets if the company was insolvent when the
assets were taken. Recovery is aided by the presumption that the company was insolvent
for the ninety days before the bankruptcy proceeding commenced.
187 Interview with C.C. Chen, Senior Vice President, International Commercial Bank
of China, in Taipei (May 1986).
188 Bankruptcy Law art. 27.
189 Id. at art. 108. This is similar to the former U.S. Chapter XI proceeding. See supra
text accompanying notes 135-36.
190 See supra p. 422.
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rarely use the Bankruptcy Law.' 91
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides for both a liquidation bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 7192 and corporate reorganization under
Chapter 11.193 Many of the provisions in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11
are identical. The bankruptcy bar in the United States is large and
there is no shortage of professional managers to step in to help turn
around companies undergoing reorganization.
Under ROC law the reorganization provisions are included in
the Company Law rather than the Bankruptcy Law. 194 The practical
absence of legal remedies in both the largely informal compositions
and the quite complex reorganization procedures creates a shortage
of qualified legal and other personnel to assist in the conduct of re-
organizations. In addition to the shortage of qualified personnel, the
corporate reorganization statute is woefully incomplete in many
areas.
IV. ROC Reorganization Proceedings in Detail
This section discusses statutory provisions of ROC company re-
organization law in the light of actual practices. Where the existing
ROC statute appears inadequate, a comparison with the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code and U.S. reorganization practice is provided.
A. Commencement of the Case
The current statute governing commencement of company reor-
ganizations in the ROC has four major weaknesses. First, no clear
standard exists for deciding which companies should be allowed to
reorganize. Second, the ROC law fails to provide for adequate no-
tice of the commencement of the proceedings or a real opportunity
for parties whose interests are affected to contest. Third, the time
the law allows for accepting or rejecting a petition is too long, creat-
ing opportunities for officers of the debtor business to deplete the
assets of the corporation while the court considers the application.
Finally, even though many major public companies which have
sought reorganization have been part of enterprise groups, no pro-
cedure exists for consolidating proceedings against affiliated compa-
nies which have done business as a single entity.
1. Access to Court-Ordered Reorganization
A petition for reorganization can be filed by a "party in'inter-
191 Interview with C.C. Chen, supra note 187. Mr. Chen, a Chinese banker with experi-
ence in corporate reorganizations, knew of only one bankruptcy case ever brought by a
publicly held company listed on a stock exchange.
192 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
193 11 U.S.C. §§ 1110- 1172 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
194 Company Law art. 282.
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est," which the statute defines to include members of the board act-
ing pursuant to a resolution, shareholders who have held stock for at
least six months, and creditors holding claims equal to or greater
than ten percent of the company's capital.' 95 The statute does not
require that the court make any particular finding in order to accept
a petition for reorganization. If the court rejects the petition, it must
be for one of the reasons listed in the statute. These grounds for
dismissal include procedural mistakes, prior bankruptcy, misrepre-
sentation of material facts in the petition, or a determination that
the company cannot be expected to become viable after
reorganization. 196
Very few companies are actually eligible to be considered for
reorganization at all. Only companies limited by shares 197 which are
also "publicly held" are eligible for reorganization. 198 Article 156 of
the Company Law requires that "a company shall apply to have its
shares offered to the public if its authorized capital exceeds a certain
amount as prescribed by order [of] the competent authority."' 199 In
1981 the MOEA ruled that a company whose capital exceeds
NT$200million (New Taiwan dollars) must offer its stock to the pub-
lic. 20 0 Publicly held companies are not limited to Taiwan Stock Ex-
change listed companies. Because "publicly held" companies are
required to make extensive disclosure of their financial condition,
many companies limit their paid-in capital to one dollar less than the
minimum required for being "publicly held." 20' As a result, the pro-
portion of "publicly held" companies to all "companies limited by
shares" is relatively small.
Before it can act on the petition the court must forward a copy
of the petition for comments to the Taiwan SEC, the MOEA and the
"central competent authority" with jurisdiction over the business of
the company (usually the Industrial Development Board). Because
financially troubled businesses had never used reorganization pro-
ceedings prior to the 1980s, many judges were extremely reluctant
195 Id.
196 Id. at arts. 282, 288.
197 The Company Law recognizes four types of legal entities: (1) unlimited compa-
nies, i.e., partnerships (Chapter II); (2) limited companies, i.e., close corporations (Chapter
III); (3) unlimited companies with limited liability shareholders, i.e., limited partnerships
(Chapter IV); and (4) companies limited by shares, i.e., corporations (Chapter V).
198 Company Law art. 282.
199 Exceptions are granted for government-approved private enterprise or where a
company has obtained "approval on a case-by-case basis from the competent authority
having jurisdiction of its line of business." Company Law art. 156. Any foreign company
which holds more than 45% of the shares is also exempted from this rule. Correspon-
dence with Chang, supra note 80; see Overseas Chinese Investment Act art. 18; ROC For-
eign Investment Act art. 18.
200 (70) shangtze 05324 (1981), cited in Correspondence with Chang, supra note 80.
201 Interview with Tracy Cheng, supra note 2.
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to take any initiative in acting on petitions. The government officials
in effect made the decision to permit reorganization, not courts.
Officers of troubled companies recognized the relative impo-
tence and detachment of the courts in these proceedings. As a result,
companies usually did not present petitions to a court before the
principals of the company had discussed the situation with the
MOEA and received tentative approval to proceed. 20 2
Chinese and American bankers are united in their agreement
that the ROC needs more rigorous standards to decide what compa-
nies should be granted court-supervised reorganization. 20 3 Bankers
have not reached a consensus, however, on what these new, more
stringent standards should be. In 1986, the MOEA considered pro-
posals to reduce the discretion of judges still further by retaining
more control over the decision to allow reorganization within the
MOEA.20 4
If the MOEA were able to assume a position similar to that of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan,
this might be a beneficial change in ROC reorganization procedure.
In Japan, MITI makes decisions to save companies in order to fur-
ther existing plans for industrial development and export promo-
tion.20 5 The decisions involve a review and evaluation by the
lending banks of the financial and operational health of the com-
pany, including close scrutiny of the conduct of existing manage-
ment if necessary. 20 6 MOEA involvement along these lines could
bring positive results in the ROC.
In U.S. bankruptcy practice, the decision to allow reorganization
is in the hands of the parties, not the court or the government.20 7
Cases are commenced voluntarily by the company or involuntarily by
creditors. 20 8 Creditors retain the power to request that a reorganiza-
tion be converted into a liquidating bankruptcy. 20 9 The court may
convert the case only upon request of a party in interest and after
notice and opportunity for a hearing has been granted to all parties
in interest.210 Grounds upon which creditors can seek to convert a
reorganization to a bankruptcy include: continuing erosion of the
value of the company's assets, inability to effectuate a plan, unrea-
sonable delay by the debtor, inability to get the necessary approval
for any plans which the debtor has proposed, and inability to effectu-
202 See supra note I regarding confidential sources.
203 Interview with C.C. Chen, supra note 187.
204 Id.
205 See C. JOHNSON, supra note 168.
206 Pascale and Rohlen, supra note 169.
207 11 U.S.C. §§ 301-303 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
208 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
209 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (1982).
210 Id.
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ate a plan which has been approved. 2 11
Prior to the 1978 reform of U.S. bankruptcy law, the SEC often
assisted bankruptcy judges by reviewing reorganization plans which
publicly held companies proposed. This was done to determine
whether they were fair to creditors and stockholders. 2 12 The SEC
applied strict financial standards and recommended liquidation
whenever it appeared that the liquidation value of the company was
higher than the expected value of future earnings of the reorganized
company.213 In theory, the financial standards the SEC applied did
not differ significantly from the standards other creditors applied,
although the SEC might be more rigorous in its application than a
group of creditors closely allied with management. 214
The foreign bankers in Taiwan have expressed concern that
neither MOEA officials nor local bankers are particularly interested
in the financial condition of firms seeking reorganization. MOEA
analysis includes a wide variety of factors such as ability to export,
strategic importance, and employment rather than focusing on finan-
cial variables such as present value of expected future earnings. 215
In 1985 American bankers were encouraged when a judge re-
jected the E An company's petition for reorganization based on the
hopeless financial condition of the company. The E An company was
an affiliate of the Ta Nun company. 216 Some American banks took
the unusual step of inviting the court and representative from the
Taiwan SEC and the Industrial Development Board to a tour of E
An's facilities. The banks also introduced evidence to show that the
company had grossly overstated the value of assets in the company's
financial, records. On the basis of financial information which the
banks presented and the guided tour, the judge rejected the petition
independent of MOEA comments because the company clearly had
no prospects for recovery.21 7
211 Id.
212 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUvrcY, supra note 150, § 7.36.
213 See, eg., In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416 (1941).
214 The Taiwan SEC has not been able to provide the same critical review. Although
the Taiwan SEC formally participates in the MOEA decision whether or not to allow reor-
ganization to proceed, its input has been based on outdated or inaccurate financial infor-
mation which the companies had previously filed with them. (The shortage of qualified
auditors on the Taiwan SEC staff has hampered its ability to critically review the financial
statements public companies file with the Taiwan SEC.) See Kaplan, Russin, Vecchi, and
Parker, Creditors' Rights and Corporate Reorganizations in the ROC-Some Recommendations 4 (pa-
per presented at 9th Annual Joint U.S.A.-ROC/ROC-U.S.A. Economic Council, Nov. 18,
1985).
215 Interview with Hank Peng, Vice President, Chemical Bank, in Taipei (May 1986).
216 The Ta Nun company also sought reorganization. See infra, Section V, p. 467 for a
case study on Ta Nun.
217 Peng, supra note 215.
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2. Inadequate Notice of Opportunity to Contest
for Interested Parties
After the petition is filed but before it has been approved, the
court may issue "protective orders" to stay actions against the com-
pany while the court considers a petition.2 18 The protective orders
are valid for up to three months and can be renewed at the request of
a party in interest or ex officio by the court for two successive three
month terms. 219 ROC law does not require that the court provide
notice or an opportunity to contest the issuance of protective orders
to parties whose interests are affected. In practice, courts have
granted the protective orders automatically upon request of the
management of the company and without any notice to creditors or
opportunity for them to contest.
Court action of this sort would normally be impossible under
U.S. law. U.S. Bankruptcy Code, section 362 provides that a petition
filed to commence bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings shall
operate as an automatic stay similar to the protective orders just de-
scribed. 220 Section 362, however, also provides a procedure where
creditors can seek relief from the automatic stay.221 The grounds
upon which a secured creditor may seek relief include lack of ade-
quate protection of the creditor's property interest or that the debtor
has no equity in the property and the property is not necessary to an
effective reorganization. 222
A well respected Chinese banker with extensive personal experi-
ence in many reorganizations, both those limited to local creditors
and those involving foreign creditors, believed that the ROC author-
ities were not likely to improve substantially the notice and opportu-
nity to contest provisions. 223 He observed that foreign banks were
very effective at asserting their legal rights and very willing to do so
whenever given the opportunity.2 24 The simplest way for the Chi-
nese authorities to retain control of the decision whether or not to
allow reorganization was to prevent foreign bank participation by
not informing them of the proceedings.
2 18 Company Law art. 287.
219 Id. Two cases are of interest in this respect. In the New East reorganization, the
court actually granted a third extension. An American bank creditor appealed the decision
as violating the plain language of the statute, but by the time the appeal was heard, the
court had approved the petition and rendered the appeal moot. In the Fu Mu reorganiza-
tion, no decision had been made two years after the petition had been lodged, but no
foreign banks were involved and none of the local creditors appealed.
220 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
221 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
222 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(l)-(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
223 See supra note I regarding confidential sources.
224 Id.
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3. Dissipation of Company Assets While the Petition
Is Being Considered
Under Article 287 of the ROC Company Law, the court has the
power to institute various protective measures to preserve the assets
of the company while it considers the petition for reorganization. In-
terested parties can petition the court to stay proceedings in bank-
ruptcy, compulsory execution, or composition proceedings, or to
limit the company in its conduct of its business or in the fulfillment
of its obligations. In practice, however, management has been able
to stay creditors' actions before becoming subject to effective court
scrutiny. Rapid dissipation of liquid assets and movable property
while the court considers interim protective orders has been particu-
larly detrimental to the unsecured creditors whom the court-ordered
reorganization is supposed to protect.
ROC courts also have the power to freeze assets belonging to
managers or directors of the company who may be liable for corpo-
rate debts, although courts have not used this power extensively.225
In the Delta Petrochemical case, the attempt to freeze the assets of
personal guarantors of company obligations proved ineffective be-
cause, prior to petitioning for reorganization, the individuals in-
volved transferred all their assets beyond the reach of their creditors.
Creditors were unable to avoid the transfers under Article 244 of the
Civil Code2 26 because they could not establish the necessary factual
basis for recovery. 227
U.S. law now provides more effective procedures for preventing
dissipation of the company's assets during the early months of the
reorganization procedure. Before the 1978 reforms, U.S. bank-
ruptcy law required creditors filing an involuntary bankruptcy peti-
tion to prove an act of bankruptcy before filing a petition.2 28 The
bankruptcy law reforms eliminated these obstacles. 229 The credi-
tors' petition is expeditiously approved unless the debtor chooses to
contest. 230  A voluntary petition for relief is automatically
granted. 23'
U.S. bankruptcy law provides for the appointment of an interim
225 See generally Company Law art. 287.
226 See infra text accompanying notes 280-81 for a discussion of Article 244 of the ROC
CIVIL CODE [hereinafter CIVIL CODE].
227 Peng, supra note 215.
228 E. WARREN &J. WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 288-89.
229 Id. at 288.
230 11 U.S.C. § 303(d), (h) (1982). Creditors are further safeguarded by the automatic
stay protection, which becomes effective withfiling a petition. See supra text accompanying
notes 221-22 for a discussion of the automatic stay under U.S. law.
231 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). If creditors feel that a voluntary application for reorgani-
zation relief should not be granted, they can argue that the case should be converted to
straight bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).
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trustee in liquidation bankruptcies. 232 The court can appoint an in-
terim trustee promptly after it has received a petition seeking bank-
ruptcy relief.23 3 The interim trustee has all the powers of a trustee to
protect the assets of the debtor.234
The role of a supervisor in ROC bankruptcy law differs from an
interim trustee in that the supervisor has no power to take positive
steps to protect company assets from improper dissipation by
insiders.2 35
In addition to lacking any statutory provision for a representa-
tive of creditors' interests with concrete powers to protect a com-
pany's assets while interim orders are in effect, Taiwan suffers from a
shortage of qualified personnel to handle the task. The absence of
any real bankruptcy practice results in the lack of an organized bank-
ruptcy bar. Few business people are trained in professional manage-
ment techniques and able to take over the management of a
financially troubled company. Some well respected academics with a
lack of practical management experience have assisted in reorganiza-
tions, but have been unable to control management abuses.
4. Substantive Consolidation of Cases Involving Companies
with Affiliates
Under U.S. company reorganization law the court may require
that affiliated companies be consolidated and treated as one entity in
order to protect the rights of creditors of the individual compa-
nies. 2 36 This power of the courts to consolidate companies which
are separately incorporated is not based on any express statutory
provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, but rather on the general
equitable powers of U.S. courts to prevent fraud.2 37 Courts have dis-
agreed on when a court is justified in consolidating cases, but some
jurisdictions have found consolidation appropriate when the interre-
lationships of the affiliates are so "hopelessly obscured" that the af-
fairs of the affiliates cannot be disentangled by the court.23 8 Others
have suggested that consolidation is appropriate when failure to con-
solidate would unjustly affect the claim of a creditor who had reason-
ably relied on the credit of an affiliate.2 39
Substantive consolidation is an area of U.S. law which is cur-
rently developing and does not yet present a clear model from which
232 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
233 11 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
234 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702(d), 704 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
235 Company Law art. 285. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the role of the supervisor in German and ROC company law.
236 See, e.g., Note, Substantive Consolidations in Bankruptcy: A Flow-of-Assets Approach, 65
CALIF. L. REv. 720 (1977).
237 Id.
238 Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2nd Cir. 1966).
239 Id. at 848 (Friendly, J., concurring).
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the ROC could draw suggestions for the reform of its corporate reor-
ganization law. Given the prevalence with which major publicly held
companies use affiliated companies to frustrate corporate creditors,
some form of substantive consolidation is desirable under ROC law.
The ability of creditors to demand the consolidation of affiliated
companies within a reorganization reduces the incentive for manage-
ment to use affiliates to transfer assets out of the company prior to
filing. 24 0
B. Management of the Estate
After the court approves the petition and the reorganization
process begins, several major problems emerge. One such problem
is the inadequacy of mechanisms for controlling the conduct of ex-
isting company management acting as the reorganization manager.
The outside professionals who act as reorganization supervisors and
who are supposed to supervise the conduct of the reorganization
managers have been unwilling or unable to significantly affect the
conduct of the reorganization. The courts have allowed suspect
claims by creditors with inadequate critical review. Powers to avoid
fraudulent or preferential transfers in order to draw assets back into
the company are inadequate.
1. Conduct of the Reorganization Manager
Both ROC and U.S. company reorganization law favor keeping
existing management in possession of the company during reorgani-
zation. 24 1 Most parties to a reorganization agree that this solution is
the most efficient, inexpensive way to run a company during reor-
ganization. A debtor in possession under U.S. law is held to the
same standard as a trustee in managing the company affairs. 2 4 2 U.S.
bankruptcy law requires the trustee or debtor in possession to collect
the assets of the estate and manage those assets for the benefit of
parties in interest, usually the creditors. 243
Article 290 of the ROC Company Law authorizes the court to
appoint one of the current directors as the reorganization manager
unless the court finds that none of the directors are appropriate for
the position. In such a case the court can choose the reorganization
manager from among the shareholders or creditors. The ROC Com-
pany Law also imposes a fiduciary duty on the reorganization man-
ager and supervisor; they must perform their duties with the "care of
a good administrator. '244
240 Chuang, supra note 52, at 290-95.
241 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); Company Law art. 290.
242 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 1107 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
243 See 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
244 Company Law art. 313.
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In theory, interested parties have the power to remove an unac-
ceptable reorganization manager.2 45 The reorganization supervisor,
who is supposed to supervise the manager, may petition the court to
have the manager removed for illegal or improper conduct.24 6
In practice, regardless of any statutory power to replace the re-
organization manager, the ROC courts often have allowed existing
management to stay on despite apparent misconduct. This practice
is due in large part to the shortage in Taiwan today of professional
managers willing or able to take control of a troubled company. It is
also due in some cases to the unwillingness of courts and local au-
thorities to critically review the competence and integrity of existing
management.
Article 293 of the Company Law provides sanctions for failure of
existing management to cooperate with the transfer of power to a
reorganization manager. Any responsible person who conceals or
destroys accounting records, conceals or destroys assets, or forges or
promotes fraudulent claims may be imprisoned for up to a year and
fined. In practice, this provision has not protected creditors from
the above abuses by reorganization managers. This failure may be
due to evidentiary difficulties, lack of cooperation between creditors,
or unwillingness of the court to act contrary to implicit or explicit
indications from government officials on the appropriate conduct of
the reorganization.
2. Reorganization Supervisors Are Ineffective in Protecting
Creditors' Interests.
Article 289 of the Company Law requires the court to appoint
an individual or financial institution with professional knowledge and
experience in operating the business of the company in reorganiza-
tion to act as reorganization supervisor. 247 In practice, reorganiza-
tion supervisors have been drawn from a variety of sources. Some
have been well respected local CPAs or academics from business or
law faculties. 248 In the Pao Lung case, one of the first major reorga-
245 Id. at art. 290.
246 U.S. reorganization law provides a different kind of standard for creditors to meet
in seeking the removal of the debtor in possession. Upon request of a party in interest and
after notice and opportunity for hearing for all interested parties, the court may order the
debtor in possession replaced with a trustee for two reasons. One is for fraud, dishonesty,
incompetence, or gross mismanagement before or after commencement of the reorganiza-
tion. The court must find not merely mismanagement but gross mismanagement, so cred-
itors must introduce compelling evidence to prevail. See II U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
The second reason for replacing the debtor in possession, however, is that it is simply
in the interest of the creditors or shareholders. This second standard is very flexible and
gives the court the discretion to evaluate the equities of each case. See II U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(2).
247 See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
248 For example, in the Hsin Chu Glass reorganization, the following people were ap-
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nizations involving many foreign banks, the Bank of America acted as
one of three supervisors. The Bank of America found that its limited
role in the proceedings was inadequate to protect creditors' inter-
ests. The overall experience was one of frustration and impotence.
The supervisor has a wide variety of administrative functions.
The supervisor oversees conduct of the reorganization managers
and must be given prior notice of certain actions by the manager.249
The supervisor has the right to obtain business and financial infor-
mation from the company's directors and managers. 250 Creditors
must file claims with the supervisor who then prepares the definitive
list of creditors and claims. 2 5 ' The supervisor also chairs all credi-
tors' and shareholders' meetings. Both the supervisor and manager
must perform their duties with the care of a "good administra-
tor."2 52 The standard of care required of a good administrator is the
highest standard under ROC law. 253 Compensation for a supervisor
or manager is set by the court after considering the nature of the
duties performed. 25 4
The statutory framework puts the supervisor in the position of
an examiner in U.S. bankruptcy law. 255 Consequently, the supervi-
sor has little statutory authority to act decisively to protect company
assets. The committee structure of many reorganization supervisors
compounds the absence of clear statutory authority. While foreign
bank creditors might desire a supervisor to be installed within the
company to take control of cash flow and prevent depletion of assets,
local creditors might not favor such a heavy handed approach to su-
pervising the reorganization manager. 256
pointed to serve as reorganization supervisors: Lin Lee-Hsin, the general manager of the
Overseas Chinese Commerical Bank, Bao Er-Yi, supervisor of Central Bank, CPA and Pro-
fessor in Accountancy at Soochow University, and Lai Yen-Ho, law professor at Cheng Chi
University.
249 Company Law art. 290.
250 Id. at art. 293.
251 Id. at arts. 297-298.
252 Id. at art. 313.
253
The concept of a good administrator should be considered in relation with
three degrees of attention or negligence. The concept of negligence
originates from the Criminal Law, but has been used also in the context of
the Civil Law. The highest degree of attention is required from a good ad-
ministrator. The three degrees, in decreasing degrees of absence of atten-
tion, are as follows: gross negligence, substantial slight negligence (the
failure to take care as though it were one's own business), [and] abstract
slight negligence (the failure to take care as a good adviser to the company.
A good adviser should pay more attention than someone who runs his own
business, because an adviser is specifically trained and professionally ap-
pointed for his task.) [sic]
Correspondence with Chang, supra note 80.
254 Id.
255 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
256 The apparent passivity of some creditors in company reorganizations in the ROC
may be due to the excessive regulation of local banks, which stifles initiative in many bank
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A foreign banker suggested that the inability of supervisors to
significantly affect the conduct of the reorganization stems from a
perceived lack of financial support.2 57 Although courts award com-
pensation for services, some bankers believe that a court award is
unlikely to reflect accurately the commitment of resources necessary
to see any results. Given the limits of the supervisor's official role,
only an individual of outstanding competence and initiative could
hope to enter the company and help turn the situation around. No
individual creditor would be willing to commit an outstanding bank
officer for an extended full time assignment with the company if no
mechanism existed for sharing the costs involved.2 58
3. No Critical Review of Some Creditors' Claims
A reorganization supervisor is responsible for preparing lists of
preferred, secured, and unsecured creditors and shareholders to-
gether with their respective claims and making the lists public. 2
59
Court hearings are held to review the claims and contested claims
are designated by court decree.2 60 Substantive disputes must be de-
cided in a separate court action within twenty days of the court de-
cree.26 1 Failure to contest before the end of the readjustment
hearings makes the finding of the supervisor final and binding on all
parties.262
U.S. company reorganization law explicitly provides that parties
in interest may object to the allowance of any claim. 26 3 After notice
and hearing, the court may disallow any claim for any one of several
grounds. 264 These grounds include that the claim or interest has not
matured, that the claim is by an insider for services rendered and the
claim exceeds the reasonable value of the services, and that the claim
exceeds the limits for allowed claims by landlords or employees. 265
One common problem with questionable claims allowed in ROC
reorganizations is the ease with which the principals of a company
officers. It may also be due to a reluctance to pursue legal remedies to extremes, either
because legal remedies are presumptively not very effective or because they are considered
inappropriate. If the principal of a company is a person of substance and reputation
within the ROC, a variety of social norms may inhibit creditors from vigorously pursuing
their legal rights. See supra text accompanying notes 18-27, 73-76.
257 See supra note I regarding confidential sources.
258 This concern is realistic, considering that the Sumitomo Bank in Japan assigned
one of its top managers to the Mazda company reorganization for over four years. See
Pascale and Rohlen, supra note 169, at 228-30.
259 Company Law art. 298.
260 Id. at art. 299.
261 Id.
262 Company Law arts. 297-299.
263 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
264 Id.
265 See id.
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can fabricate phony claims. 26 6 Postdated checks and promissory
notes are the most common forms of payment for transactions in the
unregulated money market. Article 202 of the Company Law re-
quires a board resolution to authorize any obligation of a company,
unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise.2 6 7 Many com-
panies in Taiwan have charter provisions authorizing principals of
the company to obligate the company without a board resolution.
Generally poor financial records in combination with great authority
enable the principal of a company to create without much difficulty
enormous quantities of phony obligations evidenced only by a check
or promissory note.268
A new, more stringent standard should be drawn up for review
of creditors' claims in order to reduce the possibility of collusion be-
tween management and inside creditors on the eve of reorganiza-
tion. If creditors were required to furnish more substantial evidence
of a claim than a check or promissory note, which can easily be pre-
dated just prior to petitioning for reorganization, both management
facing a cash flow crisis and unregulated lenders would have less in-
centive to engage in unrecorded financial transactions.
4. Inadequate Mechanisms for Voiding Fraudulent
or Preferential Transfers
The powerlessness of reorganization managers and supervisors
to challenge improper transactions entered into on the eve of filing
the petition for reorganization has been one of the most acute
problems in ROC company reorganization law. U.S. bankruptcy law
provides several techniques for recovering property for the benefit
of creditors: fraudulent conveyance law, the power to void preferen-
tial transfers on the eve of bankruptcy, equitable subordination of
the claims of insiders who have breached their fiduciary duties,2 69
substantive consolidations of affiliated companies, 2 70 and the power
of the trustee to assume or reject unexpired leases or executory
contracts. 2
7
'
The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 provides several tools for the
266 This problem is not unique to the ROC. A bankruptcy statute enacted in England
in 1697 was repealed within a year because "many fraudulent practices [had] been com-
mitted by making pretended agreements with persons who were not real creditors." 9 &
10 Will. 3, ch. 19, preamble, cited in Glenn, supra note 153, at 379.
267 Company Law art. 202.
268 Perhaps the most remarkable example of obligations appearing for the first time in
the reorganization process was the Ta Nun case. See infra p. 467. One banker estimated
30-40% of all allowed claims were evidenced by only checks or promissory notes and did
not appear on the books of the corporation.
269 11 U.S.C. § 747(1) (1982).
270 See supra text accompanying notes 236-40.
271 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see supra text accompanying notes 290-
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trustee in recovering assets for the estate. 272 The trustee may avoid
transfers of the debtor's property for the benefit of a creditor on ac-
count of an antecedent debt which is made within ninety days prior
to filing for court protection and which gives that creditor more than
he would recover in bankruptcy if the transfer had not been made. 2 73
This standard roughly corresponds to Article 79 of the ROC Bank-
ruptcy Law. 274 The reorganization chapter of the Company Law,
however, has no such provision.
The power of the trustee to avoid preferential transfers includes
special provisions which allow a floating lien on inventory or ac-
counts receivable to float without being voidable, so long as the se-
cured party's position does not improve as a result. 275 This
exception is very important in the United States where inventory and
accounts receivable financing are very common. It would be less sig-
nificant in Taiwan where accounts receivable financing is generally
done by discounting postdated checks, and inventory financing is not
very popular with regulated lenders who prefer fixed assets as
collateral. 276
In U.S. bankruptcy law the trustee can avoid unperfected secur-
ity interests for the benefit of the debtor's estate. 277 ROC reorgani-
zation law has no similar express provision. A real property
mortgage, however, is not effective until registered. 278 A chattel
mortgage is not effective against bona fide third parties until it has
been registered. 279 The application of these provisions in reorgani-
zations is unclear.
The Civil Code of the ROC provides creditors with some protec-
tion against fraudulent conveyances by debtors. The first provision
of Article 244 of the Civil Code permits a creditor to apply to the
court to void a gratuitous act done by the debtor which is likely to be
prejudicial to the creditor's interest. 2 0 In a 1962 case, the ROC
Supreme Court added the requirement that the creditor must prove
272 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 548, 549 (1982&Supp. IV 1986); see also H. LEBOWITZ, BANK-
RUPTcY DESKBOOK 428 (1986).
273 See II U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
274 See Bankruptcy Law art. 79.
275 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
276 See supra notes 68-69, 76, and accompanying text. The practice of requiring offset-
ting balances, however, is common among bankers in the ROC. The right of setoff in U.S.
bankruptcy law is governed by a standard similar to the one for floating liens. A U.S. bank
may setoff a claim against a cash balance immediately prior to bankruptcy, provided that
the bank's claim was not acquired from a third party or that the claim did not arise within
ninety days of commencement of the case. The bank may also be required to disgorge
assets of the debtor taken by exercise of its right of setoff if, after application of a complex
test, the trustee determines that the bank managed to reduce an insufficiency in its cash
collateral within ninety days of bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
277 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
278 CIVIL CODE art. 758.
279 ROC Chattel Secured Transaction Act, art. 5.
280 CIVIL CODE art. 244.
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that the transfer rendered the debtor insolvent. 28 1 The second pro-
vision of Article 244 provides that a creditor may avoid a nongratui-
tous transfer by the debtor if the creditor can show that the debtor
knew it was prejudicial to the creditor's interests and that the third
party knew of the prejudice at the time the transfer was made. These
standards are very difficult to meet, especially in a court system in
which litigants have few powers to discover information held by the
opposing side.
The U.S. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), by con-
trast, provides several tests for voiding fraudulent transfers. The
first test allows creditors to void conveyances made with the actual
intent to defraud present creditors. For this test the creditor must
show actual fraud by the debtor, but need not show insolvency. 282
The second test allows creditors to avoid transfers made for less than
fair consideration which render the debtor insolvent. 283 The third
test protects creditors from debtors who engage in or are about to
engage in business and after a transfer for less than fair considera-
tion, have inadequate capital with which to conduct business.284 The
fourth test protects creditors from debtors who make conveyances or
incur debts without fair consideration and thus incur debt beyond
their ability to pay.2 85 Like Article 244 the UFCA puts a heavy bur-
den on the creditor to establish a case for voiding a transfer.286 The
variety of standards available under the UFCA, however, allows cred-
itors substantially more protection under U.S. law than ROC law.
Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code indirectly incorporates the
UFCA into bankruptcy law. 28 7
The lack of any effective statutory mechanism to prevent prefer-
ential or fraudulent transfers on the eve of a petition allows grossly
inequitable practices to continue unchecked in many reorganiza-
tions. Many unregulated lenders are friends or relatives of the prin-
cipals of a company. Their investments in the form of unrecorded
loans receive the equivalent of high dividend distributions in the
form of interest payments. Their credit risk is lower than that earned
by regulated lenders who are not allowed to earn the same high re-
turns. These creditors, as insiders, are well situated to recover their
investment immediately prior to commencement of reorganization.
Another abuse has been the management practice of leasing all
the productive facilities of the company to friends in affiliated com-
281 Supreme Court judgment, Ref. No. 51 Tai Shang Tze 3528.
282 Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 7, 9B U.L.A. 138 (1918). This paper does not
deal with the new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
283 Id. at § 2(1), 9B U.L.A. 82 (1918).
284 Id. at § 5, 9B U.L.A. 135 (1918).
285 Id. at § 6, 9B U.L.A. 137 (1918).
286 Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy,
42 U. Cm. L. REV. 589, 595 (1975).
287 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982).
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panies at nominal rents. The lease is predated to give it some ap-
pearance of legitimacy. 28 8 As a result, for the duration of the
reorganization friends of management are allowed to run the com-
pany and extract all revenues in excess of a purely nominal rent. Se-
cured creditors are forced to watch the value of their equipment
collateral depreciate while protective orders prevent enforcement of
their rights. No effective mechanism exists for creditors to avoid
such leases. An American banker has estimated that these lease
arrangements exist in as many as fifty percent of company
reorganizations.
In theory, the reorganization manager could choose to accept or
reject these lease obligations. Article 290, paragraph 5(4) provides
that, subject to prior approval by the reorganization supervisor, the
reorganization manager may execute or cancel an important, long-
term obligation of the company. Paragraph 5(6) allows the reorgani-
zation manager to relinquish or transfer any rights of the company.
Reorganization managers have not, in fact, used these powers to
avoid questionable obligations.289
U.S. bankruptcy law formerly required the trustee to demon-
strate that an executory contract or lease was a burden to the estate
in order to avoid the obligation.290 Under Chapter 11, section 365
of the new Bankruptcy Code, the decision is now within the business
judgment of the trustee subject only to court approval. 29 1 Damages
arising from the rejection of an unperformed obligation become an
unsecured claim, assuming no security was taken originally.292
Where the contract is a lease, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code further lim-
its the amount the lessor can recover for the rejection of a long-term
lease.2 93 Although the U.S. provisions are intended to apply in a
situation where the debtor is a lessee, not the lessor, the ROC law
could incorporate an analogous provision. By expressly requiring
the reorganization manager to reject leases which burden the estate
and by limiting the lessee's recovery for rejection of long-term
leases, the abuses of leasing productive facilities might be controlled.
A legal standard alone would not be effective in controlling collusive
or fraudulent practices by company management on the eve of reor-
ganization, but it might encourage greater judicial intervention on
behalf of creditors.
288 In the Yi Hing Hang case, the principals were so inept that the predated lease was
dated prior to the date when title to the property was acquired, thus exposing the fraud.
289 Without access to court records of the proceedings it is difficult to be sure why this
has been so. See infra text accompanying note 341.
290 11 U.S.C. § 602 (1976).
291 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
292 11 U.S.C. § 50 2 (g).
293 The lessor is limited to the greater of one year's rent or 15% of the remaining rent,
but not more than three years rent, See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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C. Conduct of Creditors' Meetings.
Some of the major reforms in U.S. company reorganization law
in the 1930s came in the area of "protective committees" or credi-
tors' meetings. 294 The problem of creditors' committees' abuse of
fiduciary duties and oppression of small investors has not arisen in
Taiwan, where conflicts between different groups of creditors have
instead stalemated attempts to draw up reorganization plans.
1. Existing Class Divisions Are Too Broad
Under ROC law claimants are divided into the following groups:
preferred, secured, and unsecured creditors, and shareholders. 295
At creditors' meetings, creditors hear reports and comments on the
financial condition of the company and the proposed reorganization,
discuss and vote on the reorganization plan, and attend to any other
matters relating to the reorganization. 296 Voting at meetings is by a
majority based on amount of claims. A reorganization plan, how-
ever, can only be approved by a two-thirds majority. 297
ROC law has no provision corresponding to the U.S. bankruptcy
rule that secured creditors are secured only to the extent of the value
of their collateral and are unsecured for any claim in excess of the
value of the collateral. 298 As a result, secured creditors' groups are
crowded with creditors holding worthless mortgage rights.
U.S. reorganization law provides the court and parties in inter-
est with more freedom in creating groups of creditors. The only
committee which must be created is the unsecured creditors' com-
mittee.299 A party in interest may request the court to create addi-
tional committees of creditors or shareholders.3 0 0 The creation of
special committees historically gave some creditors disproportionate
power over other creditors. 30 1 The Bankruptcy Code now provides
that classification of creditors be based on the nature of their claims
and not unfairly discriminate against small creditors. 30 2
The common practice of requiring guarantees from principals
and affiliated companies in Taiwan has resulted in many claims
against companies in reorganization arising from obligations which
the company co-made, but for which the company never received any
value.303 This practice has led some creditors to suggest that credi-
294 See supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
295 Company Law art. 298.
296 Id. at art. 301.
297 Id. at arts. 298, 302.
298 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
299 Id. at § 1102(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
300 Id. at § 1102.
301 SEC REPORT, supra note 121, at 863, el seq.
302 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1982).
303 See supra text accompanying notes 266-68.
4551988]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & Com. REG.
tors with claims arising from value given to the company in reorgani-
zation should be given priority over claims for apparently co-made
obligations for which the company in substance was only a guaran-
tor. In the Ta Nun case the court rejected this suggestion because
"direct" and "contingent" liabilities are not recognized concepts in
ROC reorganization law. The power to subdivide classes of credi-
tors would allow these types of claims to be distinguished in
reorganization.
Another important power U.S. courts have to insure fair treat-
ment between creditors is the power to subordinate insiders'
claims. 30 4 Under the doctrine of equitable subordination, if inside
creditors have mismanaged the affairs of the company to their own
benefit or to the detriment of creditors, the courts may subordinate
the inside creditors' claims to those of outside creditors. The doc-
trine of equitable subordination is most likely to be applied in the
United States where the apparent wrongdoer is an insider.30 5 Regu-
lated creditors in Taiwan should be allowed to seek subordination of
insiders' unsecured claims evidenced only by a note or check, if evi-
dence indicates bad faith or collusion, but is not strong enough to
disallow these claims altogether.
2. Conflicting Perspectives Make Agreement on a Plan Difficult
In many reorganization proceedings local government-owned or
supervised banks, foreign banks, trade creditors, employees, and un-
regulated lenders are involved as claimants. Some major conflicts of
interest have arisen between foreign banks and local banks, foreign
banks and unregulated lenders, and between the foreign banks
themselves. These tensions originate outside company reorganiza-
tion law.
Foreign banks opened branches in Taiwan in large numbers be-
ginning in 1979.306 In 1979, only twelve foreign bank branches were
located in Taipei. These banks focused on export financing and sov-
ereign lending. By 1982, twenty-nine foreign bank branches were
located in Taipei. Since most foreign banks were recent arrivals to
the lending market in Taiwan, they were forced to lend unsecured.
Local banks had long established relationships with most companies
approached by the lending officers of the new foreign bank branches
and had long since taken security interests in all fixed assets of their
borrowers. Foreign banks had lent unsecured or against security
that on closer examination proved to be worthless.
U.S. banks announced their intention to follow modern banking
practices, such as cash flow lending based on analysis of financial
304 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1982).
305 E. WARREN &J. WESTBROOK, supra note 148, at 546.
306 See supra note 2.
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statements. Newly arrived bankers aggressively pursued local bor-
rowers and were often unaware or unconcerned that a borrower
might be accepting funds from several foreign banks simultaneously.
Foreign bankers did not initially question the ability of local busi-
nessmen to use the funds in profitable investments and so did not
closely monitor their use of bank credits.
As Taiwan's economy moved into a severe recession in 1983,
many problems with financial statements prepared by local busi-
nesses and endorsed by local CPAs became apparent. Once foreign
banks learned that the financial statements they had relied upon in
granting credits were often inaccurate and in some cases complete
fabrications, they began to rely more heavily on rumors of problems
with borrowers in making decisions to withdraw credits.30 7 Once
companies were faced with insolvency, foreign bankers tended to
emphasize the bad faith of management in preparing financial state-
ments and in failing to disclose unregulated borrowing. Local bank-
ers and borrowers emphasized instead the lack of a long-term
commitment among foreign bankers to the local economy, and the
ability of foreign banks to cause the collapse of a company by sud-
denly withdrawing lines of credit based on rumors that other banks
were doing the same.
In U.S. company reorganizations secured creditors are often the
most critical parties in interest in evaluating a company's chance of
success in reorganization. Secured creditors are generally critical
observers of the reorganization process because, if the reorganiza-
tion is converted into a straight liquidation, they will be able to re-
cover the value of their collateral more promptly. In company
reorganizations in the ROC, secured creditors are often local banks.
Employees of local banks in the ROC do not have the same incen-
tives as secured creditors in the United States to convert a reorgani-
zation into a liquidation. Local bankers are effectively civil servants
rather than businessmen. As- a civil servant, the bank officer in
charge of lending to the company in reorganization is held person-
ally responsible if it becomes necessary to write off any loans to that
company.308
Ministry of Finance (MOF) regulations provide that
nonperforming loans to companies in court-ordered reorganizations
need not be recorded as nonperforming for the duration of the reor-
307 Cf text accompanying notes 76 and 161. The development of the accounting pro-
fession in Taiwan has not kept pace with the economy's rapid development. Expertise and
professional integrity are often lacking among local CPAs. R. Chen, An Evaluation of
Some Aspects of the Public Accounting Profession in Taiwan 181 (1973) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, U.Missouri-Columbia). American bankers were unaware of the nature of Tai-
wan's accounting profession when they began their aggressive lending programs in the
early 1980s.
308 Liang, supra note 72, at 9.
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ganization. The responsible lending officer, therefore, has an inter-
est in preventing the termination of the reorganization if to do so
would force recognition of a loss and possibly result in the imposi-
tion of administrative penalties against him personally for the
loss. 30 9 Any bad faith delay by management in the conduct of a reor-
ganization in the ROC is compounded by the fact that the employees
of local banks also have an interest in delay. Foreign bankers have
often complained that this situation leads to a disregard of the actual
financial condition of the company in reorganization.
The bureaucratic inflexibility of local bankers not only makes
negotiations with foreign bankers difficult, it prevents government-
owned banks in the ROC from playing the same supportive role in
economic development which banks in Japan have played.3 10 Banks
in Japan are given incentives from the central government to en-
courage their borrowers to adopt professional management tech-
niques. By stifling any entrepreneurial initiative within local banks,
ROC authorities make it difficult for government-owned banks to
provide the same encouragement to ROC companies.
D. Quality of Plans Submitted
Very few workable plans have been produced in reorganization
proceedings. Many companies sought reorganization to delay per-
formance on their obligations to creditors. Although the Company
Law gives the court authority to "cram down" a reasonable plan, 31 1
in practice courts have put very little pressure on management to
produce plans and end the reorganization proceedings. If the court
has made the decision to allow reorganization by taking into account
a large number of general economic variables, the court should dis-
tribute the costs of reorganization among all the parties expected to
benefit. The failure to require management to cooperate in good
faith in the reorganization effort makes attainment of the general
economic objectives unlikely and puts the costs of the reorganization
on the unsecured creditors.
1. ROC Company Law Has No Workable "Feasibility"
Standard
The reorganization manager is responsible for drawing up a
3o9 For a discussion of Control Yuan punishment of any individual bank officer held
responsible for a bad loan, see supra text accompanying notes 73-76.
Bad loans in Taiwan cannot be written off without review of the case by the Control
Yuan. While Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of China bank examination standards
tend to support modern banking practices, Control Yuan investigations focus on finding
guilt and punishing responsible parties.
310 Pascale and Rohlen, supra note 169, at 228-33.
311 Company Law art. 306.
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plan and submitting it to the meetings of interested parties. 3 12 If the
interested parties approve the plan, the court must review the plan.
Court review includes submission of the plan to the MOEA and Tai-
wan SEC for comment.313 If the interested parties reject the plan,
the court may still submit the plan to the MOEA and Taiwan SEC for
review and amendment.3 14 The amended plan is resubmitted to the
interested parties. If the interested parties still do not approve the
amended plan, the court has the power to terminate the reorganiza-
tion proceedings or to enter a decree implementing the amended
plan. 315 None of the provisions relating to court-ordered amend-
ments to a plan and court approval in the absence of approval by
interested parties have ever been used in any reorganizations to
date.
The confirmation standards of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code are
very complex. Confirmation standards are meant to insure that no
interested party is forced to accept any reorganization plan which
does not offer at least as much as that party would receive in a
straight liquidating bankruptcy. 31 6 Any creditor who is to receive
full satisfaction of its claim is conclusively presumed to have assented
to the plan. 31 7 Very complex cram down provisions guarantee that
secured creditors are able to either retain their mortgage interest, or
receive cash payments equal to their allowed secured claims plus in-
terest at market rates. 318 Unsecured creditors receive payment of
their claims in full, or at least a guarantee that no junior classes are
to receive any benefit without the unsecured creditors' consent.31 9
Independent of any safeguards for creditors or voting require-
ments, a U.S. court cannot approve a plan unless the court finds that
the plan is likely to succeed. 320 This feasibility standard might be
implied in the ROC Company Law requirement that the court seek
the recommendations of the MOEA. The ROC statute contains no
express feasibility standard and in practice the courts have applied
no such standard.
MOEA proposals for reform of reorganization law suggested a
fixed time limit, such as two years from approval of a petition, to deal
with the problem of companies using reorganization to delay per-
312 Id. at 303.
313 Id. at arts. 305, 307.
314 Id.
315 Id. at arts. 306-307. The amendments the court may make include: transferring all
encumbered property and claims to the new company, releasing encumbered property to
secured creditors in satisfaction of their claims, or any other fair and reasonable means to
continue the company's business and protect the rights of creditors.
316 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
317 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(o, 1124 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
318 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
319 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
320 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
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formance of obligations indefinitely. 32' A feasibility standard and
granting creditors the power to convert a reorganization to a liquida-
tion would allow creditors rather than bureaucrats more control over
the conduct of the proceedings and allow greater flexibility in deal-
ing with individual cases.
The U.S. feasibility standard is workable in part because bank-
ruptcy judges are willing to receive evidence of the financial condi-
tion of the company and to form an independent evaluation of the
evidence presented. In order to prevent an end-run by management
around any attempt to impose a feasibility standard, ROC courts
must scrutinize more closely the financial statements which reorgani-
zation managers offer in proposed plans. Some reorganization plans
have contained projections of increasing earnings and profits with no
factual basis whatsoever. Many plans also include repayment sched-
ules of ten years or more. The plans offer creditors repayment guar-
anteed by fabricated projections of future profitability and' virtually
indefinite repayment periods. Under such circumstances creditors
are willing to sell such obligations at deep discounts following ac-
ceptance of such plans.
2. Creditors' Claims Cannot Be Converted to Equity in the
Reorganized Company.
Article 272 of the Company Law provides that the company may
issue new shares only for cash. In several reorganizations courts
have interpreted this requirement to mean that debtors cannot con-
vert unsecured creditors' claims to equity in the reorganized com-
pany. This interpretation is diametrically opposed to the U.S.
concept of the reorganization process. According to that view, "re-
organization proceedings provide nothing more than a method by
which the sale of an enterprise as a going concern may be made to
the creditors themselves. '" 3 22
By strictly upholding the Company Law provision disallowing
the conversion of claims against a company into shares, ROC courts
have created an enormous obstacle to successful reorganizations.
Once a company's problems become known, very few creditors are
willing to extend new credit. Mistrust between local and foreign
bankers has exacerbated the problem of securing existing credits and
finding infusions of capital. 323 When new capital is very difficult to
obtain, the assets already in the company in the form of unsecured
claims are an obvious and important source of capital.
321 Interview with C.C. Chen, supra note 187.
322 Jackson, supra note 104, at 893. See supra p. 428 for the historical development of
U.S. company reorganization law.
323 See supra p. 456-58.
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V. Case Studies3 24
A. Delta Petrochemical/Grand Pacific
Delta Petrochemical is the only major company in Taiwan to
have emerged from court-ordered reorganization procedures as a vi-
able company. Changes in world commodity prices for its major
products forced the company to seek reorganization in 1983. The
company replaced prior management and shareholders in the course
of the reorganization. The forceful leadership of Ronald Ho and
C.C. Chen of the International Commerce Bank of China (ICBC),
Delta's largest single creditor, was instrumental in obtaining capital
infusions from official sources as well as assuring cooperation among
bank creditors-both foreign and local.
Delta Petrochemical was founded in 1974 by overseas Chi-
nese3 25 entrepreneurs to whom the ROC authorities had given a va-
riety of incentives to set up a business in Taiwan. Under the one
company, one product policy in effect at the time, the company was
given an exclusive license for the production of styrene monomer,
which insured its profitability.3 26 This venture was one of a group of
highly publicized central government infrastructure projects
launched during the 1970s. 327
Because Delta was a government licensed monopoly, its man-
agement was able to dictate prices and exercise considerable discre-
tion in allocation of output in the local ROC market. Business
relations between Delta and its three main customers became in-
creasingly strained. In the late 1970s the customers successfully lob-
bied the authorities to give them their own license to produce
styrene monomer. A move by the government to open the local mar-
ket to imports in 1980 coincided with a steep drop in the world price
of styrene monomer.
At the same time, however, Delta began building a second, more
modern styrene plant as well as two plants which used styrene in
production of other plastics products. By 1981, Delta was borrowing
heavily to cover operating losses. According to Chen at ICBC, 328
324 See supra note I regarding confidential sources.
325 The ROC Government distinguishes non-ROC citizens of Chinese descent, known
as overseas Chinese, and all other foreigners. Non-ROC citizens of Chinese descent are
often given preferential treatment by the ROC Government compared with other
foreigners.
326 The policy objectives behind granting these licenses were to reduce Taiwan's reli-
ance on imports of essential raw materials and to protect infant industries from the full
force of international price competition. Monopoly licenses combined with import barri-
ers were granted to local companies to produce raw materials needed in Taiwan's manu-
facturing industries at prices which did not exceed the cost of importing the same
materials.
327 These were known as the "Ten Major Construction Projects." REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
A REFERENCE BOOK 256 (1987).
328 Interview with C.C. Chen, supra note 187.
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Delta's debt/equity ratio declined from 69/1 in 1979 to 593/1 in
1982.
The principals of the company turned to the authorities for fi-
nancial support, relying on their long standing relationship and the
importance of the petrochemical industry in official economic plans.
The authorities conducted an appraisal of the company's financial
situation and prospects for future profitability and determined that
the company was worth bailing out. The chairman, who had contrib-
uted to the breakdown in relations with Delta's main customers, be-
came little more than a figurehead. The president took effective
control of Delta during the conduct of the reorganization and contin-
ues to lead the company.
Delta began the reorganization in August 1983 and appeared to
have completed it by August 1984. Bankers at ICBC provided the
greatest leadership in the conduct of the reorganization. The force-
ful leadership provided by these bankers was an important element
contributing to the ultimate success of the Delta reorganization-
leadership which was apparently not forthcoming from the ranks of
creditors in most other reorganizations. ICBC, along with the Bank
of Communications (the ROC development bank), and the Bank of
Taiwan (the largest commercial bank in the ROC), acted as reorgani-
zation supervisor. As the largest unsecured creditor, ICBC had good
reason to exert considerable efforts to insure that recalcitrant foreign
banks as well as local banks cooperated during the reorganization
and approved the plan. The foreign banks, however, managed to
condition their participation on a substantial capital contribution by
local financial institutions and shareholders.
Unlike other companies, Delta Petrochemical was able to obtain
major infusions of capital. Many attempted reorganizations in the
ROC failed because creditors could not convert their claims into eq-
uity in the reorganized company and were also unwilling to contrib-
ute new funds. Two trust companies and a government controlled
development fund contributed the equivalent of forty million U.S.
dollars in new capital to Delta. These contributions from official
sources were due in part to the economic fundamentals of the case,
but also were a reflection of the effectiveness of bankers at ICBC in
lobbying on behalf of Delta. Two new shareholders also contributed
equity.
In 1985, the viability of what was otherwise the only successful
reorganization in Taiwan came into question. The world prices of
styrene monomer remained low and Delta, now renamed Grand Pa-
cific, was forced to seek additional concessions from creditors. Inter-
ested parties consented to amendments to the plan delaying
principal repayments and reducing interest payments from 6 percent
to 3 percent until 1987.
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By the second half of 1986, Grand Pacific was again profitable.
The local economy had recovered from recession, the new facilities
which had been brought on line in the early eighties were producing
at prices which were competitive on world markets, and the world
market price had risen substantially. According to Chen, Grand Pa-
cific anticipated being able to complete payments by the end of 1987,
ahead of schedule under the plan.3 29
B. Pao Lung Pulp and Paper Company
Before major problems surfaced in late 1982, Pao Lung ("pre-
cious and prosperous" in Chinese) was considered one of the best
run and most progressive companies in Taiwan. Pao Lung was listed
on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and had had numerous successful
public offerings. Even the largest public companies in Taiwan are
unwilling to allow large public issues for fear of losing control and
because of resistance to disclosure requirements. Pao Lung ap-
peared to be an unusual example of enlightened modern
management.
-The ROC strictly regulates the paper industry in Taiwan for
what were originally national security reasons. Wood pulp must be
imported to Taiwan. The ROC import substitution policies of the
1950s placed severe restrictions on the use of paper products.330 A
major market for Pao Lung products is packaging for the export in-
dustries. As a result, the company's fortunes are closely tied to the
fortunes of Taiwan's exporters. When the U.S. economy, Taiwan's
largest single export market, moved into recession in 1982, the econ-
omy of Taiwan also slipped into recession. Pao Lung Paper suffered
just as badly as its exporter clients with the slowdown of sales to
America. With a significant drop in revenues, many irregularities in
the management and finances of the company came to light for the
first time.
In early 1983, Pao Lung became unable to make principal repay-
ments on its short term debt. Out of a total of two and a half billion
New Taiwan dollars in obligations, Pao Lung owed about one-half to
foreign banks. Pao Lung also had made major investments in new
equipment, but was experiencing difficulties in bringing the new ma-
chinery on line.3 3 1 The different perspectives between foreign and
local creditors quickly emerged as a major issue as creditors at-
tempted to organize a collective response to the company's
problems. 332
329 Id.
330 Until January 1, 1988, daily newspapers in Taiwan were limited to twelve pages
under the paper conservation policy implemented in the 1950s. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly
Edition, Jan. 11, 1988, at 2, col. 1.
331 Asian Wall St. J., June 7, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
332 See supra text accompanying note 307.
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Pao Lung was closely affiliated with two other companies, Great
Wall Enterprises (GW) and Lien Hwa Industrial Co. (LH).3 3 3 The
principals of GW and LH had given personal and corporate guaran-
tees for many of Pao Lung's obligations in exchange for guarantees
from Pao Lung's principals. Some foreign banks had not effectively
supported their loans with corporate guarantees, relying only on the
personal guarantees of the principals. 334 In the Pao Lung case bank-
ers who had relied on personal guarantees alone ultimately recov-
ered nothing on those guarantees.3 35
In early 1983, the principals sought government assistance. The
Bank of Communications (BOC), a state-owned bank that focuses on
development finance, was appointed to coordinate government sup-
port efforts, a role BOC assumed in many subsequent reorganiza-
tions and workouts. In the early days of the Pao Lung case, BOC was
unwilling to provide extensive assistance and insisted that Pao Lung
management arrange new loans with banks without concrete govern-
ment assistance. 336 Local banks and foreign banks attempted to
work out an informal rescue package without success.
In late May, the chairman and president of Pao Lung agreed to
step down if necessary to the success of a rescue plan. About this
time Pao Lung mortgaged a substantial quantity of real estate to GW
and LH in return for corporate guarantees on its borrowing with lo-
cal banks. Shortly thereafter the principals, Yang and Chiao, skipped
the country. 337
333 The informal affiliation between Pao Lung, Great Wall, and Lien Hwa is a good
example of the informal yet close ties which create what Chuang calls "enterprise groups."
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
334 Foreign banks had often been satisfied with the personal guarantees of a com-
pany's chairman and president, who were often prominent local citizens. Local banks gen-
erally require not only the personal guarantees of the principals on all corporate
obligations, regardless of the size of the company, but also corporate guarantees of all
related companies. One reason, for this practice is that ROC company law has no doctrine
like "piercing the corporate veil." For a discussion of the use of the personal guarantees
of a company's principals, see supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
335 The Pao Lung case was frustrating for foreign bankers inexperienced with local
business practices. Many bankers learned to their chagrin that the principals of major,
publicly held companies could be judgment proof because of inadequate legal tools for
dealing with fraudulent conveyances.
336 Asian Wall St. J., supra note 331, at 3, col. 2.
337 UntilJuly 1987, the ROC had strict exchange controls to prevent capital outflows,
but businessmen had a variety of techniques to evade them and shelter very large sums
offshore. These techniques included understating invoice prices, receiving part payment
in foreign countries, and setting up Hong Kong subsidiaries which were not subject to any
exchange controls. While these practices had gone on for some time to evade taxes and
because of anxiety over the future sovereignty of Taiwan, they assumed a new importance
when many enterprises in the ROC unexpectedly faced bankruptcy. The principals of the
failing companies were largely unfazed by their companies' slide into bankruptcy; they
themselves had capital in foreign countries with which to start over. As a result, for a brief
period in 1983 and 1984, the principals of failing businesses skipped the country in record
numbers.
Eventually creditors discovered a technique to deal with this particular problem. By
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A variety of problems began to surface in the summer of 1983
which called the integrity of the Pao Lung management into ques-
tion. Pao Lung management had grossly overstated the value of the
new equipment, presumably to siphon funds out of the country.
Creditors who had taken security interests in the equipment based
on the value stated for customs duty purposes discovered that they
were effectively unsecured.
Securities market manipulations also came to light. The princi-
pals had apparently set up subsidiary companies to buy stock in Pao
Lung prior to new share issues to drive up the market price.
Although this practice had been successful several times in the past,
the most recent attempt was frustrated by the general economic re-
cession and decline in stock market prices. 338 The principals had
borrowed heavily from foreign banks to finance the manipulation,
although lenders were not aware of how the funds were being used.
Sidestreaming, or diverting funds borrowed for one purpose to an-
other use, is a common practice in Taiwan which is facilitated by in-
adequate financial records. When the Pao Lung manipulation failed,
the loan proceeds and the stock certificates involved all disappeared
without a trace.3 39 Although Pao Lung stock remained listed on the
Taiwan Stock Exchange, the stock soon became worthless.
The Taiwan SEC investigation found that financial statements
had been falsified and prosecuted the principals. In May 1984 in
spite of very strong evidence against the principals, they were acquit-
ted by the trial court at Taipei. The Taiwan SEC appealed the judg-
ment, but after three years no hearing of the case on appeal had
been scheduled. 340
Foreign banks who had lost millions of dollars in loans to Pao
reporting an "economic criminal" to the Investigation Bureau and Exit & Entry Control
divisions of the Ministry of the Interior, creditors could prevent defaulting debtors from
leaving the country by legitimate means. Of course, it remained possible to leave by pri-
vate ship or forged passport. The economic recovery which began in 1985 has now largely
eliminated the problem.
338 Interview with Lu Daung-Yen, Commissioner of Taiwan SEC, in Taipei (May
1986).
339 As egregious as this fraud was, it pales in comparison with the activities of the
principals of the Hsin Chu Glass Company, another major, publicly held company that had
to seek reorganization relief in 1985. The principals of Hsin Chu approached a foreign
bank lender for an additional line of credit secured by a pledge of stock. As soon as the
credit was made available, it was withdrawn and the principals skipped the country. The
certificates were then discovered to be forgeries.
Shortly thereafter, more forged certificates turned up in the hands of members of the
investing public. These additional forged shares had apparently been pledged to unregu-
lated lenders who then sold them on the stock exchange as soon as they learned that the
principals had skipped. There was some suggestion of complicity between the brokerage
firms who handled the trades and the original pledgees because the Taiwan SEC managed
to pressure the brokers into compensating the individual investors for their losses in an
informal settlement. Chen, Financial Scandals Lend Impetus to Stock [Market] Improvement, in
FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENT YEARBOOK ROC 1986, at 74.
340 Interview with Lu, supra note 338.
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Lung requested a copy of the trial transcript to learn the grounds for
the decision. The court denied the request. Court records are gen-
erally not open to the public in the ROC. 3 4 1 The court determined
that foreign bank lenders to Pao Lung were not "parties in interest"
to the criminal prosecution of the principals for securities fraud and
therefore were not entitled to see the transcript.
In September 1983, the Bank of America petitioned to place Pao
Lung in reorganization. The Bank of America's reasons for the peti-
tion included severe cash flow problems and failure of management
to deal effectively with the crisis, as well as the securities fraud and
other mismanagement by Pao Lung's senior management. Bank of
America sought and obtained protective orders for the period while
the petition was considered. The company shut down its productive
facilities in June 1983 and remained closed until 1986.
In March 1984 the court approved the petition for reorganiza-
tion. Han and Miao, directors of GW and LH, were appointed reor-
ganization managers. Larry Greenberg, head of Bank of America's
branch in Taipei, along with Mr. H.P. Chia, president of BOC, and
Mr. Ni, president of United World Chinese Commercial Bank, were
appointed reorganization supervisors.
Management submitted the first of two plans in May 1985. The
plan's main features were writing off existing equity, extending the
maturity and reducing the interest on existing obligations, and con-
verting a portion of unsecured claims into new equity. 34 2
Foreign bank creditors continued to pressure Miao and Han to
make good on their personal guarantees without any success. Credit
investigation in Taiwan is rudimentary at best and no effective mech-
anisms exist for recovering fraudulent conveyances. 343 Some for-
eign banks which had required GW and LH to co-make several
obligations with Pao Lung had more success in recovering.3 44
The court reviewed the May 1985 plan at length and ultimately
refused to approve it. The court found that the provision to convert
unsecured claims into equity violated article 272 of the Company
Law, which requires companies to pay for all subscriptions in cash.
The plan actually provided that the court could sever the offending
341 Digests of specially selected Supreme Court judgments that are considered prece-
dent are published, however.
342 See supra p. 433-40 for a general discussion of reorganization plans.
343 See supra text accompanying notes 159-61 & 280-81.
344 GW and LH tried to effect a discharge of their surety obligations through a compo-
sition. Article 27 of the ROC Bankruptcy Code provides: "A resolution for composition
at the creditors' meeting shall be adopted by a majority vote of the creditors present at the
meeting, who together represent more than two-thirds of the aggregate amount of un-
secured obligatory claims." Miao and Han initiated the composition proceedings near
their home in the south of Taiwan and tried to pack the creditors' meeting with their allies.
However, two U.S. banks held more than one-third in total claims and were able to veto
the composition settlement. Chen, supra note 339, at 72, 74.
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provision from the plan and disregard it in the event the court held it
to be unlawful. The reorganization manager's lawyer also offered to
withdraw the provision in order to get approval. The court never-
theless rejected the plan, delaying the reorganization further.
A second plan was drawn up but never approved. In the sum-
mer of 1986, the economy of Taiwan had recovered to such a point
that the Pao Lung facilities could again be profitable. Miao and Han
approached creditors individually and bought up their outstanding
claims for a fraction of face value.
3 45
C. Ta Nun
The Ta Nun ("Great Ability" in Chinese) case is interesting be-
cause the perceptions of local and foreign bankers diverged pro-
foundly in their evaluations of this case. Some local bankers believed
that the Ta Nun group of companies was highly profitable, if some-
what unorthodox in its internal accounting practices, and that its fail-
ure was largely precipitated by the sudden cancellation of lines of
credit by foreign bankers acting in concert. Foreign bankers, how-
ever, believed that the problems of the company were due to fraudu-
lent mismanagement of parent and subsidiary affairs and the failure
of many highly speculative investments with the recession in Taiwan.
Foreign bankers also believed that the principals of Ta Nun made no
secret of their alleged connections with the Military Intelligence Bu-
reau and failed to participate in good faith in the reorganization
proceedings.3 46
The Ta Nun group included about a dozen different companies,
but the Ta Nun company was the heart of the group. The Ta Nun
company had been granted a monopoly license for the production of
sodium cyanide in Taiwan and was highly profitable as a result. The
Ta Nun group invested profits from the monopoly in a wide variety
of businesses. Other members of the group included companies
producing cement, paper, nickel sulphate, porcelain, as well as a con-
struction company and a semiconductor assembly plant.
Financial control for the group remained concentrated in the Ta
Nun parent company without regard to the separate parent-subsidi-
ary corporate entities. Ta Nun management structured cash flow to
345 By 1987, following the adoption of reorganization plans, offers were made by man-
agement in several cases to purchase company obligations at a small fraction of their face
value. Foreign bankers speculated that reorganization proceedings had been used to wear
down creditor resistance to management settlement offers. Management secured exten-
sive delay through reorganization. By buying up obligations under the plan at a deep
discount, they also secured the equivalent of a dividend payout, taxable only as capital gain
if the company returned to profitability.
346 Foreign bankers also believed that some important people in the ROC establish-
ment were included among Ta Nun's major shareholders and that this affected the han-
dling of the case. The speculation focused on one of President Chiang's sons.
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pass through the parent.3 4 7 Such a system works well enough, so
long as no one subsidiary experiences more serious problems than
any other.348
The foreign banks lent heavily to the Ta Nun group, unaware
that Ta Nun was also borrowing heavily from private lenders. When
problems emerged in Ta Nun and some other companies in the
group, foreign bankers insisted on treating each company as a sepa-
rate entity, which aggravated cash flow problems for the group as a
whole. 349 The Ta Nun case clearly pointed to the need for some
mechanism for consolidating the finances and administration of affil-
iated companies, both within the context of a court-ordered reorgan-
ization and in ROC company law generally.
One of the companies in the group was the E An company. Ta
Nun had purchased the E An company and had made a public offer-
ing of the company's stock to raise cash for the group as a whole.
After the initial public offering the stock price dropped sharply when
investors reappraised the value of the company.3 50 E An filed sepa-
rately for reorganization, but the court denied the petition and liqui-
dated the company, largely at the insistence of foreign bank
creditors.
Following the petition for reorganization by Ta Nun, foreign
and local bank opinions remained sharply divided on the correct
manner of handling the company's problems. Local banks believed
that foreign banks had precipitated the problem by first extending
substantial credits to the group without adequate investigation, and
then suddenly withdrawing credits as a group based largely on ru-
mors of problems with the company. Foreign bankers believed that
the principal of Ta Nun was using reorganization solely to delay
meeting any obligations to banks and that no genuine effort was be-
ing made to draw up a reorganization plan.
Foreign bankers were also uncomfortable with the record num-
bers of unrecorded lenders who surfaced to file claims in the reor-
ganization. As many as one-third of the claims allowed in the
reorganization were not recorded in the company accounts.
In November 1985, the reorganization manager submitted a
plan which was unacceptable to foreign bankers. The foreign bank-
ers successfully lobbied to have someone from the Taiwan office of
the Peat Marwick accounting firm called in as a consultant and in-
dependent auditor.
Ta Nun drew up another plan which creditors expected would
347 For a discussion of the failure of ROC Company Law to effectively protect credi-
tors of companies which belong to "enterprise groups," see supra text accompanying notes
95-100.
348 See supra note I regarding confidential sources.
349 Id.
350 See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
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be adopted sometime in 1987. Ta Nun's primary financial resource
remains the license for the production of sodium cyanide, which is
expected to generate enough profits in the long term to meet most
of the group's existing obligations. Although management was able
to retain the profitable monopoly license, they were unable to secure
any new capital contributions. Shareholders were forced to accept a
fifty percent reduction in equity, while creditors agreed to a payment
schedule which extended to more than ten years for some claims.
VI. Conclusion
ROC courts and government policymakers today stand at a
threshold similar to the one crossed when the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Boyd in 1913. In the United States in the late nineteenth
century, industrialization and the increased importance of the corpo-
rate form of doing business had created problems which the U.S.
legal system had difficulty solving. Boyd effectively amended the ex-
isting law by requiring lower courts to scrutinize the substantive fair-
ness of company reorganizations. Although Boyd required courts to
provide some supervision of the equity receivership procedure and
to control the worst abuses, it gave little concrete guidance on how
courts should carry out these new responsibilities. In the 1930s,
Congress drafted a statute based on the experiences of company re-
organizations in the 1920s and 1930s which provided a comprehen-
sive, workable system for reorganizations.
In the ROC today, the inadequacies of the existing reorganiza-
tion law have forced courts to deal with novel and complex problems
in attempting to administer the company reorganization law. The
results have been discouraging. Most reorganizations have ended in
failure. Misconduct by interested parties has marred many reorgani-
zation attempts. The situation is unlikely to improve without more
forceful judicial intervention and supervision of the process. ROC
courts, as creations of the civil law system, do not have the freedom
U.S. courts enjoy to create new law to address new problems. With-
out legislative reform of the existing statute, the courts are not likely
to resolve existing problems.
Does the ROC need a company reorganization statute at all?
The argument can be made that it does not. The undeveloped sys-
tem of ROC bankruptcy law has resulted in a dearth of legal practi-
tioners and court personnel with bankruptcy experience. Court-
ordered company reorganization is a complex and labor intensive
process. It will be difficult to administer effectively in the short to
medium term without any bankruptcy experience to draw upon.
The development of a very complex U.S.-style reorganization
statute might also be undesirable to ROC authorities because it
would put the resolution of important economic questions in the
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hands of the parties and the courts and reduce the discretion of gov-
ernment officials responsible for economic policy. The failure of a
major business involves powerful people and important economic is-
sues. The authoritarian style of government that prevails in Taiwan
results in such important decisions being made by an elite within the
KMT and the government.
While company reorganization is an essential element of the
present system of corporate finance in the United States, the need
for such a system may not be so great in the ROC. Businesses and
government officials in the ROC rely less on their legal system than
do their counterparts in the United States. The financial structure of
major, publicly held companies in Taiwan is not as complex as those
of companies in similar positions in the United States. Some of the
abuses of existing ROC reorganization law would not arise under
composition procedures which exempt secured creditors altogether
and require consent of two-thirds of unsecured creditors. Reliance
on creditor self-help and informal cooperation, however, might sim-
ply allow the same abuses to take place outside of a formal legal pro-
ceeding. Furthermore, official ROC policies on the further economic
development of Taiwan are based on a transition from labor inten-
sive, low technology industry to capital intensive, high technology
industry. In the event of another serious and prolonged recession in
the ROC, or in the event that the transition to capital intensive, high
technology industry is successful, the ROC will need a sophisticated
procedure to sort out the claims of parties in interest against finan-
cially distressed companies.
If the ROC authorities make an official commitment to provide a
court-ordered reorganization procedure for dealing with company
failures, substantial changes need to be made to the current statute
in order for the ROC system to operate effectively. If authorities at
the MOEA retain the authority to decide which companies are enti-
tled to rescue efforts, then the MOEA must make some attempt to
insure that the parties who benefit from the rescue efforts also shoul-
der the costs. The current lack of clear standards for initiating and
continuing reorganizations not only encourages misconduct by the
reorganization manager, it also prevents any clear assessment of the
costs and benefits of the rescue. If the authorities believe a company
is worth bailing out and choose to disregard the financial condition
of the company, then they should underwrite their decision with
commitment of funds for the rescue effort. Allowing the MOEA to
approve a reorganization without requiring a commitment of gov-
ernment resources to make the reorganization work, unfairly leaves
creditors of the failing company to pay the cost.
The implementation of more stringent financial and accounting
standards is an essential step in the internationalization of the econ-
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omy of the ROC. The system for enforcing legal entitlements also
needs to be strengthened. Any new legislation must clarify and en-
force the duty of the reorganization managers to maximize the estate
for the benefit of creditors. The ROC must also reinforce the legal
mechanisms for drawing assets into the estate, and the courts must
assert their authority over the proceedings more forcefully.
The ROC will require more than statutory reforms in bank-
ruptcy and corporate reorganization to solve the problems which
plagued the first attempts at court-ordered reorganizations in the
ROC. The ROC also needs reforms in other areas like accounting
standards and the regulation of government owned banks. The gov-
ernment must address the conditions in financial markets and the
private economic sector which encouraged the rise of the unregu-
lated money market. Finally, the formalistic and impotent ROC
courts must be able to take control of the procedure. Even with ma-
jor statutory reform, creditors cannot easily bring company insiders
who make loans which are not disclosed in company financial state-
ments within the jurisdiction of the courts. Likewise, the courts are
not likely to assert their authority in a contest with policymakers in
the executive branch of government. Statutory reforms would only
be a first step in dealing with these issues.
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